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This is an enquiry into the application of the United States and European 
Community trade laws, specifically antidumping laws, to the imports of 
nonmarket economy GATT contracting parties, specifically Poland, the Czech and 
Slovak Republic, and Hungary. Reference is also made to Romania, Russia, and 
China. The United States and European Community trade instruments and their 
case applications fall to be considered in the light of the rules of the General 
Agreement and the multilateral codes thereunder. There is a question mark over 
legality of the preference for antidumping over antisubsidy trade remedy 
responses, particularly in the Georgetown Steel case. This question touches on 
legality of the threat of antidumping duties to secure voluntary restraint 
agreements on price and export quantities. The general approach of the United 
States and European Community to import trade from Eastern European 
nonmarket economies contrast in their response to the market economy changes 
in these countries. This approach is illustrated both by the application of trade 
remedies in particular cases and in the wider context by bilateral treaty programs. 
The European Community stands to gain by aiming for a free trade area excepted 
by GATT from the Most Favored Nation obligation, whereas the United States 
has been slower to adapt. A change of attitude and a change of rules will be in the 





























































































The Annexes which were to form part of this paper have been omitted 
because of reproduction difficulties. The reader is referred to the following 
sources:
1. The Eighth Annual Report of the Commission on the Community’s 
Antidumping and Antisubsidy Activities, released 29 January 1991 
(Brussels).
2. Table Summary of Antidumping Activity amongst Contracting Parties 
1986-1989, GATT Activities, Geneva 1990.
3. Table Summary of Antidumping Activity amongst Contracting Parties 
1989-1990, Report o f the Committee on Antidumping Practices, 37 BISD 1991.
4. Table Summary of Antidumping Activity amongst Contracting Parties 
1988-1989, Report o f the Committee on Antidumping Practices. 36 BISD 1990. 
p.439.
5. Table Summary of Antidumping Activity amongst Contracting Parties 
1986-1988. Report o f the Committee on Antidumping Practices, 35 BISD 1989. 
p.359.
6. Table Summary of Antidumping Activity amongst Contracting Parties 























































































































































































I THE STATUS OF A NONMARKET ECONOMY COUNTRY
A. Introduction
At the conclusion of the general debate of the Forty Fifth Session of 
the GATT the chairman noted three major points:
- World trade growth had been impressive but was unequally 
distributed.
- The alarming tendency on the part of some major trading 
nations to take unilateral decisions on retaliation measures.
This tendency had undermined the credibility of the GATT 
system.
- The implementation of protective measures through misuse of 
GATT rules such as those on antidumping.1
At the time of drafting the International Trade Organization (ITO)
charter,2 the intention was that the ITO would be a universal organisation
encompassing countries of all economic structures. The drafters of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 itself, however, were pursuing
the goals of reduction of tariffs and trade liberalization consistent with the
needs of market economy countries. Like many of the persistent problems
with GATT, the difficulty in applying GATT rules and multilateral concepts
to the mutual satisfaction of both nonmarket and market economy
contracting parties arises in part from the failure of the Havana Charter.
1 GATT Activities 1989 (Geneva, June 1990).
2 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO), March 
24, 1948 (never in force).




























































































This institutional gap left it open to dominant contracting parties to shape 
the development of international trade law to promote their idealogies and 
interests, and to interpret that law in antidumping and countervailing duty 
legislation, as well as bilateral agreements. Although the occasional 
determinations of GATT panels are important for particular issues, in the 
absence of an effective court it is up to informed independent opinion to 
point to imbalances and encourage reform. The most recent annual GATT 
report remarked on the increasing recourse to GATT settlement procedures 
particularly under the Tokyo Round but noted that the failure to implement 
decisions continued to undermine their effectiveness.4 This is the objective 
of the criticism of this paper, which aims to be informed rather than expert, 
of the worlds two mighty trade lawyers, the United States and the EC.
The term "nonmarket economy" is generally applied to countries 
where goods, services, and resources are allocated according to the central 
government’s economic plan, where there is no "price mechanism", no 
"invisible hand", no market balancing of price and demand, no free flow 
of capital - in short, no market. International trade, one of the "economic 
heights" seized early on by the Bolsheviks, is conducted through Foreign 
Trade Organizations, which are juridically separate from the state, though




























































































controlled as a state monopoly. The emerging economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe are increasingly inadequately characterised by this 
description. Yet it remains the superficial basis for the application of special 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws to their exports.
One hundred and two countries comprise the current membership of 
GATT. In economic terms, they divide up as follows:
Industrialized Countries 25
(of which European Community 12)
Advanced Developing Countries 10
Developing Countries 56
Nonmarket economies h
Of these last six, four were members of the recently dissolved Warsaw Pact 
and defunct Soviet led trade bloc Comecon (or CMEA - Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance)/ These are Hungary/' Poland, Romania/ and 567
5 The other two are Yugoslavia, which went through the normal 
accession process, and Cuba, who was an original entrant. Yugoslavia is 
particularly difficult to characterize. It is often used as a surrogate country 
in countervailing duty cases to determine normal value for a particular 
product (see below). At the time of writing China is negotiating to rejoin as 
a new member, and the interest of the USSR in membership has been 
increasing since 1985.
6 Protocol for the Accession of Hungary, GATT. B1SD 20 Supp.3 (1974).




























































































Czechoslovakia,1' all of whom are Council Members. The terms "nonmarket
economies" or "nonmarket economy countries", without more, in this paper
refer to these four countries in particular. As the political importance of
weakening these countries economic dependence on the Russian Federation
decreases, the economic importance of establishing good trading relations
in a multilateral framework increases. The nonmarket economy countries
are opening their markets to all the imports needed to modernize, and to
satisfy liberated consumer demand; to pay for this they seek to increase
exports beyond the moribund Comecon:
A new challenge to policy makers in the 1990s is provided by 
the efforts of the East European countries and the Soviet Union 
to reform their economies and stimulate economic growth... 
both the level and pattern of world trade will be affected as 
their trade with countries outside the CMEA increases in 
importance.8 910
Professor Jackson asserts:
The GATT trading system is based on principles of free trade 
in free markets. The GATT rules make sense in that context... 
they make much less sense in the case of trade involving
8 Protocol for the Accession of Romania, GATT, BISD 15 Supp. 5 
(1972).
9 Czechoslovakia was an original entrant in 1954, w'hen it was still a 
market economy.




























































































nonmarket economies or state trading monopolies."
The rules certainly make little sense after the United States and the 
European Community have purported to implement them. It is in all the 
parties interest to move away from antidumping law and back to a modified 
countervailing duty / subsidy determination approach, which is at least 
closer to the GATT rules than the current system.1 2 Furthermore the 
United States, unlike the European Community, has failed to take the 
opportunity to establish the sort of programmatic trade agreements which 
the European Community is pursuing as part of an overall or "holistic” 
approach to the interface problem.
B. Rules Dependent on Status Alone 
1. GATT
Attaching a simplistic label such as "market" or "nonmarket" 
to something as complex as a national economy is inaccurate, 
but a necessity no matter which approach to import relief is 
chosen13
Changes in the economies of Eastern Europe have reached the stage where
11 J.H. Jackson and W.D. Davey, Legal Problems o f International 
Economic Relations, Second Edition (1986).
12 The term "countervailing duty" in this paper refers throughout to 
anti-subsidy measures.
13 G.N. Horlick and S.S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. 




























































































the label "nonmarket economy” is too inaccurate to be a necessity for 
import relief regulation which is both fair and workable. Poland, for 
example, recently claimed that it maintains one of the most liberal trading 
regimes in the world.14 15
fi) Article XVII
"Article XVII addresses the problem of state trading enterprises and 
its provisions are not very rigorous."1-'  On its face the Article applies not 
only to the FTOs of nonmarket economies, but also to the state controlled 
enterprises of all economies, for example even sectors of the advanced 
industrialized economies of Western Europe, as in France or Italy, so far 
as they tend towards an économie dirigée. The application of the Article to 
both state controlled enterprises in an otherwise "free" market, as well as 
to nonmarket economy organizations that are instrumentalities of a 
centrally planned economy, may be particularly important as the 
nonmarket economies continue to evolve their market structure.
Under paragraph 1(a) each GATT contracting party undertakes that:
If it establishes or maintains a State enterprise... or grants to
14 Europe April 1991.




























































































any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special 
privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales 
involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent 
with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment 
prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures 
affecting imports or exports by private traders.
The generally accepted interpretation is that this Article contains only a
general Most Favored Nation [MFN] obligation, not a "national treatment”
obligation in the sense of Article 111. Consequently the provision, and indeed
the rest of the Article, is primarily concerned with the treatment of imports
into nonmarket economies, not with the rights of contracting parties to
respond to imports. Since in practice imports into nonmarket economies
have been limited,16 not least due to the inability to pay for them, an
understandable reaction is: "they won't [or can't] buy from us, why should
our liberal policies encourage our consumers to support their economy?”.
This has been a dilemma of interfacing trade between different
economies17 18under the post-war system.11
16 Section III.D.l.
17 Section V.B.l.
18 Three primary goals pursued at the international level through the 
Bretton-Woods system are 1) high employment, 2) stable exchange rates, 
and 3) trade liberalization. These goals correspond to the triad of 
institutions under the Bretton-Woods system: 1) the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); 2) the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) concerned with balance of payments; and 3) GATT, concerned 
with foreign trade. The pursuit of these three goals has not always been 




























































































(ii) A question of law
Yet one ought not conclude, as Jackson does, that "most of the 
economic activity of this economy evades the effective responsibilities and 
policies of GATT".19 Effective for what, and policies of whom? GATT 
must be taken to mean what it says; there is no natural law of GATT. Yet 
there is a tendency for the European Community and the United States to 
assume in a propitious manner the existence of such an unwritten law, and 
thereupon appoint themselves as interpreters, and thereafter to write their 
interpretation into protectionist and aggressive domestic trade laws. This 
paper will endeavor to show that such laws are more questionable, both 
legally and under "the policies of GATT", than the practices of nonmarket 
economies.
Jackson admits that nonmarket economies are often "in complete 
conformity with the technical rules of GATT" and that it may be politically 
impossible to tighten discipline on state trading in the Uruguay Round.20
result in the depression of manufacturing sectors which lack a comparative 
advantage, thus bringing a decrease in employment, and an increase in the 
balance of payments deficit. Since the Bretton Woods system was initiated, 
employment has been the primary domestic political, and hence 
international economic, goal.




























































































This is an unconscious acknowledgement that, as far as the General 
Agreement is concerned, much of the activity natural to a nonmarket 
economy is lawful.21 Article XVII, the only GATT article specifically 
concerned with the sort of practices most often associated with nonmarket 
economy countries, primarily seeks only to encourage state trading 
companies to act along lines parallel to a commercial enterprise. They may 
be nonmarket economies, they are not enemies.
(iii) Notification
The only obligation concerning exports imposed specifically on 
nonmarket economies is notification. Paragraph 4(a) requires notification 
of the contracting parties by nonmarket economies22 of products exported 
from their territories by enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 
1(a). Paragraph 4(c) grants a right to a contracting party which "has 
reason to believe that its interests under this agreement are being adversely
21 There is another obligation relating to imports by state trading 
enterprises relating to import activities that amount to quantitative 
restrictions. The Interpretative Note on Articles XI, XII, XII, XIV, and 
XVII (the quantitative restrictions articles) in the Notes and Supplementary 
Provisions annexed to GATT provides that throughout those articles "the 
term ‘import restrictions’... include[s] restrictions made effective through 
state trading operations."
22 "The obligation is clearly placed on the contracting party, not on the 





























































































affected by the operations of an enterprise of the kind described in 
paragraph 1 (a)" to request the nonmarket economy "to supply such 
information regarding the carrying out of the provisions of this 
Agreement". This might have been an important right in the calculation of 
foreign market value under domestic antidumping law.23 But in 
characteristic GATT style, the subparagraph following deprives it of its 
efficacy:
The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any 
contracting party to disclose confidential information which 
would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the 
public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial 
interests of particular enterprises.24
Foreign trade legislation does encourage the supply of information, but for 
the dubious reason that it is in the interests of the investigated exporter to 
try to avoid the partisan guesswork of the investigator.25
(iv) Protocol obligations
Article XIX permits "escape clause" relief in the form of modification 
of concessions granted under the Agreement if as a result of "unforeseen 
developments" increases in imports of a product "cause or threaten to
23 Section V.B.2(ii).





























































































cause serious injury to domestic producers."26 Such modification is not 
targeted against a specific producer or country, but against a product, and 
is applied generally because of the MFN principal. The Protocols of 
Accession of Hungary, Poland, and Romania, did secure two major 
substantive rights for contracting parties specifically against nonmarket 
economies’ exports. Firstly, they allow the use of this Article on a non-MFN,
1. e. a selective, basis. Secondly, they provide for the possibility of withdrawal 
of concessions after negotiations. These "selective safeguard" and 
protectionist provisions, whose effectiveness is multiplied by the difference 
in bargaining power, presage the antidumping responses below.
2. The European Community
European Community trade law27 contains no definition of 
nonmarket economy:28 it uses a legislative list. Council Regulation of 1988 
("the 1988 Regulation"), on protection against dumped or subsidized 
imports from countries not members of the European Economic 
Community, expressly refers to those countries to which previous
26 Article XIX (l)(a).
27 The Community’s competence in this area is summarized in Section
Il.C.l(i).




























































































regulations apply. In the case of the nonmarket economies considered here, 
the measure is Regulation 1765/82.29 This approach appears to differ 
radically from the United States method considered below.
3. The United States
(i) Background
The roots of the United States regime for imports from nonmarket 
economies lie in McCarthyism and the reaction to the Cold War. In 1951 
Congress passed a law prohibiting the grant of MFN status to countries 
dominated by world communism.30 A later example of this attitude was the 
"Jackson-Vanik amendment", promoted particularly by the Jewish lobby, 
which withheld the entitlement of MFN status to communist countries who 
restricted free emigration. At the time the Nixon administration was 
pursuing a policy of détente. Negotiations towards an MFN agreement with 
the Soviet Union (which was never ratified) roused Congress to action, and 
this amendment was included in title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.31 At 
the same time, Section 40632 was adopted. Attitudes changed, especially in
29 (EEC) No 1765/82, OJ No L 195, 5.782, considered infra..
30 Pub.L. No. 49, ch 139, Section 5,65 Stat. 73 (1951).





























































































the executive branch of government, and the United States was willing for 
Poland , Romania, and Hungary to join GATT.
However under the 1974 Act the United States must opt out of a 
GATT relationship with a new, communist contracting party by exercising 
its non-application rights under Article XXXV. The United States then 
enters into similar arrangements on a bilateral arrangement, but with a 
legislatively mandated review of the relationship, and with the possibility of 
application of Section 406.33 Hungary and Romania are under such an 
arrangement;34 but in 1988 Romania renounced its MFN status and the 
United States suspended it.35
(ii) Determination of status as a nonmarket economy
Unlike either GATT or the European Community, the United States 
does define the term "nonmarket economy"; it was given a statutory, 
functional definition for the first time in Section 1316 of the 1988 Act. This 
added a new Section 771 (18)(A) to Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
which defines a nonmarket economy as:
33 Sections V.B.2(iv)(a) and (b).
34 See J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System (1989), p.294.




























































































any foreign country that the administering authority [the 
Department of Commerce] determines does not operate on 
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of 
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the 
merchandise.
Subparagraph (B) lists the factors to be considered:
(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is 
convertible...
(ii) the extent to which wage rates are determined by free 
bargaining...
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by 
firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign 
country,
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means 
of production,
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of 
resources and over the price and output decisions of 
enterprises, and
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers 
appropriate.36
On the face of this section, the whole matter is on a case by case, non­
political basis. Not so. The determination is made by the Department of 
Commerce, and under subparagraph (D) is not subject to the judicial 
review otherwise available under subtitle B of this title. This is important 
when one considers that the status of the nonmarket economies under
36 These factors follow preexisting Department of Commerce 
methodology: See P.D.Ehrenhaft, The Application of Antidumping Duties to 
Imports From "Non-market Economies" p.302, footnote 1, in Antidumping 
Law and Practice, edited by J.H.Jackson and E.A.VermuIst. See also the 




























































































consideration might have already changed if the determination was purely 
economic and apolitical, certainly in the case of Hungary. Most of the 
nonmarket economies will now only meet objectively a few of the criteria. 
If the case by case basis is adhered to in more than just form, soon 
nonmarket economy producers will be able to prove "costs as ‘real’ as those 
of producers... subject to other ‘normal’ antidumping cases."37
(iii) Change of status
At the moment the countries considered in the European Community 
legislative list as nonmarket economies correspond to the determinations of 
the Department of Commerce. That this determination is unfavorable to the 
investigated organisation is illustrated by the fact that the investigated 
organisation is always keen to hotly contest the status; that it operates as 
an a priori list is shown by the way "sophisticated counsel advise their 
clients not to bother".38 Ehrenhaft states that these provisions are 
"virtually unique in this body of legislation in ‘judicializing’ administrative
37 G.N. Horlick, The United States Antidumping System, in Antidumping 






























































































proceedings beyond recognition."39 It is undeniably a "judicialization" in
form, but as Vermulst wrote in 1987:
it is unlikely that the Department will ever easily change its 
qualification of a "State-controlled economy", even in situations 
where socialist economies are rapidly moving in more market- 
oriented directions (such as Hungary...)40
The European Community’s approach, though in form less adaptable, is at
least honest. The repercussions of a determination that an industry in a
nonmarket economy was guided by market forces would radically affect the
application of countervailing duty and antidumping law, Section 406, MFN
status, not to mention the whole question of bilateral relationship outside
of GATT in the case of Hungary and Romania. Such a decision is not likely
to be made on the persuasiveness of a foreign respondents legal arguments.
In one of the most recent nonmarket economy countervailing duty cases,
which concerned the importation of chrome plated lug nuts from the
People’s Republic of China, the respondent made a plausible case that the
manufacturer in question was independent from government control. For
the Import Administration of the ITA it was sufficient to draw on its final
determination of sales at less than fair value in Certain Headgear from the
39 The Application of Antidumping Duties to Imports from "Non-market 
Economies" Op. cit., p.309.
40 E.A. Vermulst, Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States and 




























































































People’s Republic of China:41
Despite the fact that cotton cloth purchased by headgear 
producers is outside the government plan, the large presence of 
the government in the production of cotton cloth would indicate 
that its actions affect the prices and quantities available for 
producers outside the plan.42
This uncharitable determination was supported by CIA reports.
C. Conclusion
Nonmarket economies are subject to different approaches by the 
United States and the European Community before they even start to trade. 
The different attitudes to nonmarket economies will be seen to be reflected 
in their trade law systems overall. The GATT rules themselves are 
permissive and neutral; the domestic laws are not. The special obligations 
imposed by the Protocols of Accession have not been considered sufficient 
by the European Community or the United States.
41 54 FR 11983 (23 March 1989).




























































































II. RESPONSES TO NONMARKET ECONOMY EXPORTS: 
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
A. The Economics of Subsidies
A government can affect international trade by subsidies in two 
ways.43 Firstly, when a government subsidizes domestic produce, foreign 
imports find it difficult to compete in price, and thus the market is 
protected. Secondly, the subsidy may be in the production and export of 
goods, thus enabling the domestic goods to have a competitive price 
advantage in foreign markets. Production subsidies, which apply to all 
domestic output of a product, and export subsidies, which apply only to 
those exported, are of concern to the importing state because they place 
home producers of the same or like products at a competitive disadvantage. 
The export of subsidized goods can be met with countervailing duty law, in 
order to "level the playing field". The application of football analogies to 
international relations is a dangerous sport. The playing field for 
nonmarket economies and less developed countries was not level to begin 
with. In the Uruguay Round Review of Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures India noted that underdeveloped infrastructure, fragmented 
markets, poor marketing, and the high cost of some inputs required





























































































offsetting subsidies to enter the field in the first place.44 Bangladesh 
pointed out that subsidies form an integral part of economic development 
programs.45
Subsidies are not generally prohibited under international law; most 
of GATT rules concern the use of countervailing duties, since these of 
themselves operate as a barrier to trade, and the remainder concern 
restrictions on the use of subsidies. The economic effects of subsidizing are 
a matter of current debate: the trend of opinion suggests that it is the 
country who does the subsidizing that automatically pays for his "crime" 
through losses in net national economic wealth whilst the rest of the world 
gains.46 Certainly in regard to each country importing subsidized goods, 
the benefit of lower prices to the consumer offsets the possible harm to 
native producers. However it is generally the well organized producers who 
have the government’s ear, for example when they are represented by 
professional lobbyists in the hearings of the various congressional
44 GATT Activities 1989 (Geneva, June 1990), p. 62.
45 GATT Activities 1989 (Geneva, June 1990), p. 62.



























































































committees and subcommittees which consider trade matters.47 The United 
States has been responsible for the imposition of ninety per cent of the 
countervailing duties imposed by contracting parties during the 1980s.48
B. The GATT Subsidy Rules
1. Restrictions on the use o f subsidies 
(i) Article XVI
Unlike Article VI, Article XVI concerns subsidies alone. Unlike Article 
VI, it does not confine itself to permissible responses. There is a prohibition 
(of sorts) in paragraph 4, but it is confined to the grant of subsidies to non­
primary products where the subsidy results in the sale for export at a price 
lower than the price charged on the domestic market. The 1955 review 
session introduced these amendments, the first substantive obligations 
regarding subsidies. This prohibition is contained under Section B, entitled 
"Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies", and consequently only applies 
to export subsidies of non-primary products, and not general, production, 
or domestic subsidies. Furthermore, a declaration applying these paragraph
20
47 See Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee of Ways and Means of the House 
of Representatives, Ser 98-15, 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
48 Uruguay Round Review of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, GATT 




























































































4 obligations was opened for signature in 1962 but has only been signed by 
the industrialized countries. So under the GATT alone, the use of subsidies 
by nonmarket economies is not illegal, though a restrictive trade measure 
in response thereto may be legal.
(ii) Multilateral Trade Negotiation Subsidies Code
There are two principal agreements which concern the subject in 
hand which were the product of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in 
whose negotiation the nonmarket economy countries took part. Officially 
entitled the "Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, 
XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", the 
Subsidies Code has been signed by most industrialized contracting parties, 
but not by any nonmarket economy country.49 Jackson calls it: "the first 
general multilateral discipline of the use of subsidies in international trade 
and the first elaboration of the subsidy rules since the 1955 GATT 
amendments"50 Due to the absence of unanimity in this area, lawyers tend 
to look to these MTN codes for guidance. There is also a tendency to 
consider its provisions as in some measure customary international law.
49 Similarly in the case of the Tokyo Round Code on Government 
Procurement, but not the case with the Antidumping Code considered in 
Section IV.A.l.iii.




























































































Moreover, the Agreement, like many of the MTN Codes (including the Anti- 
Dumping Code) purports to be an interpretation of the GATT, and 
certainly has interpretative value. Consequently, although the Subsidies 
Code does not now apply to nonmarket economies on a multilateral basis, 
it does effect trade relations with them.
The substantive obligations under the code are divided into "Track 
I" and "Track II" obligations. "Track II", i.e. Part II, concerns the 
international obligations on governments to refrain from the use of 
subsidies. Again it must be stressed that the provisions thereunder do not 
make subsidies illegal. Article 8(1) neatly sums up the ambivalence of this 
Part:
1. Signatories recognize that subsidies are used by governments 
to promote important objectives of social and economic policy. 
Signatories also recognize that subsidies may cause adverse 
effects to the interests of other signatories.
Article 11 considers for the first time "subsidies other than export 
subsidies". Paragraph 1 of this Article could have been written by the 
nonmarket economies in 1992:
1. Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export 
subsidies are widely used as important instruments for the 
promotion of social and economic policy objectives and do not 




























































































to achieve these and other important policy objectives which 
they consider desirable. Signatories note that among such 
objectives are:
...(b) to facilitate the restructuring under socially acceptable 
conditions, of certain sectors, especially where this has become 
necessary by reason of changes in trade and economic policies, 
including international agreements resulting in lower barriers 
to trade,
...(c) generally to sustain employment and to encourage re­
training and change in employment.
The other objectives, which are also recognised by the Signatories as 
so important that they do not intend to restrict the right to use them, are 
the encouragement of research and technology, tackling environmental 
problems caused by industry, and the elimination of economic and social 
disadvantages in particular regions - a veritable agenda for the governments 
of nonmarket economies in transition. The United States Court of Appeals, 
Federal Circuit, accepted last year that such activities could not constitute 
subsidy under Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.5’ Paragraph 2 merely 
contains a recognition that such subsidies may nullify or impair benefits 
accruing to another contracting party, and commands that signatories "in 
addition to the essential internal objectives to be achieved, shall also weigh, 
as far as practicable, taking into account the nature of the particular case, 
possible adverse effects on trade." 51





























































































The GATT articles and the Codes constitute the written international 
law in this area. Even if permitted trade responses are applied with full 
force to nonmarket economies, the practices per se of such economies would 
not be illegal. Since a subsidy is granted by a government, for a foreign 
importing nation to counter the subsidy is to confront directly practices 
which a sovereign trading partner thought, to be wise economic policy. In 
the face of unquestioning assumptions of the illegality or unfairness of 
nonmarket economy practices it is easy to forget that the focus of 
international trade law, in stark contrast to domestic law, is on the control 
of the responses. 23
2. Restrictions on the use o f responses 
(i) Article VI 
(a) Restrictions
Article VI(3) deals specifically with countervailing duties:
3. No countervailing duty shall be levied ... in excess of an 
amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to 
have been granted... The term "countervailing duty" shall be 
understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of 
offsetting any bounty or subsidy...
No allowed restriction apart from countervailing duty is mentioned, and if 
imposed it must be less than or equal to the subsidy. Article VI thus 




























































































not as a prohibition of subsidies. It stresses the purpose of offsetting, not 
punishing, and the restriction of the countervailing duty to the size 
necessary to offset. All other GATT provisions and agreements concerning 
subsidies, with the exception of Article XVI(l), have been accepted only by 
the industrialized country minority.52
(b) Confusion between countervailing duty and antidumping responses
Paragraph 3 of Article VI suggests, if what constitutes a subsidy 
under GATT is dealt with by an antidumping duty, that firstly the incorrect 
legal basis is being used, and secondly the antidumping duty cannot exceed 
the would-be countervailing duty:53 imports cannot be subject to higher 
barriers by virtue of their treatment as dumped goods when in fact they are 
subsidized.54 However Article VI(5) is the first of several provisions (infra 
Articles 15(1) and 19(1) of the Subsidies Code) that blur the distinction 
between responses in the form of countervailing duties and in the form of 
antidumping duties:
5. No product of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to






























































































compensate for the same situation of dumping or export 
subsidization.
A possible interpretation of this provision is that the situation can be 
treated either as subsidy or dumping (clearly not as both.) Under Article 
VI(6)(a) both the levying of anti-dumping and countervailing duties are put 
under the same injury requirement established in Article VI(1).
(ii) The Subsidies Code55
(a) The suitability of using countervailing duty law against imports from 
nonmarket economy countries.
The clearest obligations in the Code are contained in Part I, 
Articles 1 to 7; these circumscribe the rights of contracting parties to 
impose countervailing duties in response to a subsidy. The Code still does 
not supply a definition of subsidy, but does provide an "Illustrative List of 
Export Subsidies" annexed to the Agreement. Many of these are concerned 
with tax advantages, but the first two examples would apply to nonmarket 
economies:
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm 
or an industry contingent upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which 
involve a bonus on exports.




























































































Article 2(1) provides that there must be a subsidy, a material injury, and 
a causal link between the two. Article 4(2) reiterates the obligation in. 
Article VI (3) of the General Agreement that "No countervailing duty shall 
be levied on any imported product in excess of the amount of the subsidy 
found to exist."
(b) The confusion between countervailing duty and antidumping law.
Whilst the import of the Code is to further contain the use of 
countervailing duties, it also further confuses the division between 
countervailing and antidumping duties. Part IV, Article 15(1), entitled 
"Special situations" provides:
1. In cases of alleged injury caused by imports from a country 
described in NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
to the General Agreement [i.e. a nonmarket economy 
country]56 the importing signatory may base its procedures 
and measures either
56 The Interpretative Note on Article VI here referred to clearly covers 
nonmarket economy countries. Paragraph 1, point 2 provides
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country 
which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its 
trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, 
special difficulties may exist in determining price 
comparability... and in such cases importing contracting parties 
may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a 
strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may 
not always be appropriate.
This note was adopted on an initiative taken by Czechoslovakia in 1955, 
and was reflected in the old European Community legislation in Article 3(6) 




























































































(a) on this Agreement, or, alternatively
(b) on the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
On a first reading this provision apparently allows a contracting party to
react with either (though not with both - GATT Article VI (5))
countervailing duties under the Subsidies Code (the agreement referred to
in Subparagraph (a) of the provision) or with antidumping duties under the
Antidumping Code (referred to in Subparagraph (b)), to the same situation.
Furthermore, the second paragraph provides:
2. It is understood that in both cases (a) and (b) above the 
calculation of the margin of dumping or of the amount of the 
estimated subsidy can be made by comparison of the export 
price with
(a) the price at which a like product of a country other than the 
importing signatory or those mentioned above is sold, or
(b) the constructed value [defined as the cost of production plus 
a reasonable amount for administrative selling and any other 
costs and for profits] of a like product in a country other than 
the importing signatory or those mentioned above.
This Article purports to allow the signatories to treat the suspect imports
from a nonmarket economy either under its antidumping or countervailing
duty law. Whichever response a contracting party chooses, the calculation
of size of subsidy or margin of dumping, and thus the maximum size of the
imposed duty, is to be according to the same methods - either surrogate




























































































However, Part VII, Article 19 (entitled "Final Provisions"), states in 
paragraph one:
No specific action against a subsidy of another signatory can be 
taken except in accordance with the provisions of the General 
Agreement, as interpreted by this Agreement.
This would seem, like the effect of Article VI (3) on Article VI (5), to
preclude the use of antidumping law where the exporting parties practices
are better characterised as subsidy than dumping. Again, this issue is
ambiguous since there is a footnote which states: "This paragraph is not
intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of the General
Agreement, where appropriate." The footnote, however, might only refer
to the availability of escape clause (Article XIX) or nullification and
impairment (Article XXIII) proceedings. The wide acceptance that there
are interpretative difficulties and shortcomings in this Subsidies
Agreement57 58has focused attention on the Negotiating Group on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures of the Uruguay Round, who have so far failed
to reach consensus. In the Trade Negotiations Midterm review Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures'8 no mention was made of using
antidumping law where countervailing duty law was as or more readily
applicable.
87 GATT Activities 1989 (Geneva, June 1990), p. 119.




























































































C. The European Community Countervailing Duty law
1. The law
(i) The legal background
The constitutional basis for the European Community’s competence 
to act as a unit for the Member States in matters of trade law is laid by 
Chapter 4 (Commercial Policy) of the Treaty of Rome.59 Article 110 speaks 
of the customs union contributing to "the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the 
lowering of customs barriers". Article 113 provides the authority for the 
European Community to create its antidumping and countervailing duty 
systems:
the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principals, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of 
dumping or subsidies.
The European Community, represented by the Commission authorized by 
the Council under Article 113(3), is competent for the Member States in all 
GATT matters: "Member States shall... proceed within the framework of 
international organizations of an economic character only by common 
action." (Article 116 (EEC))
59 Treaty of Rome, as amended by the Single European Act (UK Treaty 




























































































External trade policy used to be governed on an administrative basis 
under Article 113, strengthened by Articles 30 to 36 (EEC).60 Third 
countries who were not GATT Member States were generally treated on an 
MFN basis unless they were the subject of special privileges as part of the 
Generalized System of Preferences (initiated in 1971) or negotiated 
reductions,61 neither of which applied to nonmarket economies.
(ii) The current law
The principal legislation which now governs Community antidumping 
and countervailing duty law is Council Regulation 2423/88 ("the 1988 
Regulation"),62 entitled a Regulation on "protection against dumped or 
subsidized imports from countries not member states of the European 
Economic Community". Article 3 (1) provides for the imposition of 
countervailing duties to offset subsidies, bestowed directly or indirectly, 
which cause injury. There is no definition of "subsidy", but the 1988 
Regulation annexes the Annex to the 1979 Code, which provides an
60 Title 1, Chapter 2, is headed: "Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions between Member States".
61 See Kennedy and Webb, Eastern Europe and the European
Community, 1990 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p.633 at 638.



























































































"illustrative list of export subsidies". As considered above,63 several of the 
illustrated subsidies are particularly applicable to nonmarket economies.
2. The problems
(i) The confusion between countervailing duty and antidumping law
Article 13 (9) of the 1988 Regulation mirrors GATT Article VI (5), 
providing:
No product shall be subject to both antidumping and 
countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one and 
the same situation arising from dumping or from the granting 
of any subsidy.
However the Regulation does not contain a provision equivalent to GATT 
Subsidies Code Article 15 (1). Nowhere does it say that a case of 
subsidization may be treated as dumping, or visa versa. However a 
Commission decision imposing countervailing duties on products already the 
subject of antidumping duties reasoned that where the reduction of 
production costs allowed an equal drop in both domestic and export prices 
the domestic subsidies cannot have influenced the dumping margin 
(presumably since the margin of dumping is the difference between 






























































































preclude the imposition of countervailing duties also.64
The 1988 Regulation does confuse antidumping and countervailing 
duty law when it comes to the calculation of the duties to be imposed on 
nonmarket economy exports, as Article 3 (4)(d) provides that in the case of 
nonmarket economy countries:
the amount of the subsidy may be determined in an appropriate 
and not unreasonable manner, by comparing the export price 
as calculated in accordance with Article 2 (8) with the normal 
value as determined in accordance with Article 2 (5).
Article 2 (5), considered in more detail below.6' provides for the
calculation of the normal value of the suspect product by the surrogate
producer or the constructed value methods - the two methods contained in
Article 15 (2) of the Subsidies Code. The result is that in any single
situation the estimated size of the subsidy and the estimated margin of
dumping will be the same.
(ii) GATT problems66
64 Imposition of provisional countervailing duties on polyester fibers and 
polyester yarns from Turkey. OJ (1991) L 137/8.
65 Section IY.B.3.





























































































One might well ask what difference this confusion makes to an 
investigation, since the calculation of values and thus the determination of 
the existence of an unfair practice will not vary. However in Article 13 (4) 
of the 1988 Regulation the factors which the Council takes as relevant in 
the determination of whether to impose increased or retroactive duties 
differ in the case of subsidy and dumping. More importantly, where the 
exporter is able because of comparative advantage to absorb the duty by 
lowering his export price, Article 13 (11) (a) allows for the imposition of an 
additional duty if the case has been dealt with as dumping; there is no 
comparable provision in the case of subsidies.
D. The United States Countervailing Duty Law67
Since Georgetown Steel the United States treats imports from 
nonmarket economy countries as dumped, never as subsidized. Before 
considering this phenomenon, the United States extreme version of the 
confusion between antidumping and countervailing duty law, a review of the 
United States countervailing duty law serves three purposes:
1) To provide the background to the change in Georgetown Steel,
67 For a general history of the search for fair value pursued through the 
United States countervailing duty and antidumping law, see G.N. Horlick 
and S.S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/ 




























































































2) To illustrate that the countervailing duty law is suitable to be applied to 
nonmarket economies, and
3) To suggest proposals for the modification of the current regime.
1. Grandfather rights
The law prior to 1974 required the Secretary of the Treasury to assess 
countervailing duties on imports which benefitted from a "bounty or grant" 
(which terms since 1922 effectively covered what are now referred to as 
"domestic" and "export" subsidies, even though domestic subsidies were 
not considered a proper target for international trade law remedies until 
1979. The original United States countervailing duty legislation predated the 
GATT with the result that in certain situations the United States may 
impose countervailing duties on subsidized imports w ithout the requirement 
of injury to domestic producers mandated by GATT Article VI. Section 
303(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,68 provided for the imposition 
of such duties.
2. Post-GATT extension o f the law imports an injury test, but not for 
nonmarket economies





























































































(0 The Trade Act of 1974
The Trade Act of 1974 extended the countervailing duty law to cover 
countervailing duty responses to subsidized duty free imports. Since this 
domestic law was enacted after the United States had incurred the 
international legal obligation of an injury test under Article VI of GATT, 
the requirement of injury applies to cover this extension of the law where 
GATT contracting parties are concerned - that is, to otherwise duty free 
imports from GATT members.
(ii) The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
Congress later approved the GATT Subsidies Code under section 2(a) 
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Section 101 of the 1979 Act added a 
new title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930, to bring United States’ law into 
conformity with the obligations thus imposed.69 Subtitle A of Title VII of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended70, applies under Section 701(a)(1) to 
"country under the Agreement". The phrase is defined in section 701(b) to 
include countries which are signatories of the Subsidies Code. Thus Section
60 Also in 1979, President Carter’s Reorganization Plan No.3 transferred 
the administration of the subsidy portions of countervailing duty law from 
the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Commerce. (Exec. 
Order No. 12188, January 4, 1980, 44 Fed. Reg. 69273.)
70 19 U.S.C. 1671; P.L. 71-361, as amended by P.L. 96-39, P.L. 98-181, 




























































































303(2) now requires a determination of injury by the Commission under 
Title VII of the 1930 Act, but only where such determination is required by 
the international obligations of the United States.
3. Effect on Nonmarket Economies
In the result, there is still no injury requirement for subsidized 
imports from nonmarket economies since they are not signatories to the 
Subsidies Code, nor are their imports duty free.
Section 303(b)(1) provides specifically that in such a situation "no 
determination by the United States International Trade Commission under 
section 703(a), 704, or 705(b) shall be required."
One of the consequences of this statutory history is that, if 
Georgetown Steel was overturned by court or Congress, there would be no 
injury requirement before countervailing duties could be imposed on 
imports from nonmarket economies, (whether or not they were GATT 
contracting parties), providing that subsidy was proved, and the imports are 
not otherwise duty free. For example, the Court of International Trade 
(CIT) in the landmark case of Continental Steel Corp. v. United States71 
(which was to become Georgetown Steel) Watson, J., noted that the




























































































proceedings were governed by Section 303 (19 U.S.C. Section 1303) because:
the countries producing the products which were the subject of 
these petitions were not countries "under the Agreement" 
within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. Section 1671(b) [Title VII of 
the Tariff Act of 1930]. This meant only that the assessment of 
countervailing duties would not require an injury determination 
if a "bounty" or "grant" was found to exist.71 2 *
4. The comparability o f the subsidies covered by the countervailing duty law 
to nonmarket economy practices
Though under Section 303 the injury requirement does not apply to 
nonmarket economies, the Section 701 process for the determination of the 
existence of subsidy prior to Georgetown Steel did. There is no straight 
definition of subsidy, but Section 771(5) provides that the term "subsidy" 
has the same meaning as the phrase "bounty or grant" used in Section 303. 
Illustrations are provided by Section 771(5)(i) and (ii): "Subsidy" includes 
any export subsidy listed in Annex A of the Subsidies Code,7'1 and any 
domestic subsidy including the "assumption of any costs or expenses of
72 Id. at 550.
71 Section II.B.2(ii)(a). Of particular note are these illustrations:
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm 
or an industry contingent upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which 



























































































manufacture, production, or distribution".74 In Continental Steel the 
practices complained of included "a beneficial rate of currency exchange to 
the exporter, allowing exporting companies to keep a portion of the hard 
currency earned from their exports and providing tax exemptions based on 
export performance",75 practices which, though even the Court of 
International Trade did not mention this, are all listed in Annex A.
39
5. No calculation of fair market value necessary
The importance of the comparability of subsidies covered by
countervailing duty law and the practices of nonmarket economies for the
applicability of countervailing duty law to nonmarket economies is
increased by the fact that no determination of fair market value is
necessary to determine the existence of a subsidy. As the C1T held:
if the "absence’ of a fair market value did not impede the 
enforcement of the antidumping law, in which it was a literal
74 Under Section 701(e), added by the 1988 Act, the Department of 
Commerce is to include in its determination the existence of "upstream 
subsidies." This term is defined in Section 771(A) as any domestic subsidy 
described in Section 771(5)(B)(i-iv) which is bestowed on an input product 
used in the manufacture or production of the merchandise which is the 
subject if the countervailing duty proceeding, if it has a significant effect on 
the cost and bestows a competitive benefit (broadly construed). However the 
sort of subsidies listed in subparagraphs (i) to (iv) are concerned primarily 
with advanced trade techniques of countries like Japan, and do not really 
cover nonmarket economy trade practices, at least as currently understood.




























































































requirement, why is its absence an impediment to the 
enforcement of a law in which it is not even a named factor, 
but merely one of the possible guides to the detection or 
measurement of subsidies.76
Whereas the determination of the existence of a subsidy and the net amount 
of that subsidy are separate, in the case of dumping the determination of 
foreign market value and United States price (and hence the margin of 
dumping) is one and the same as the determination of the existence of 
dumping. The regulations of the International Trade Association of the 
Department of Commerce provide that the Secretary of the Department of 
Commerce will maintain a library of foreign subsidies practices in order to 
help in the determination of the existence of a subsidy.77 78
6. Georgetown Steel abolishes antisubsidy countervailing duty law for 
nonmarket economies™
Georgetown Steel petitioned the International Trade Administration 
(ITA) of the Department of Commerce79 on behalf of domestic producers
76 614 F.Supp. 548, 555 (CIT 1985).
7719 Code of Federal Regulations Ch.III (4-1-90 Edition), Section 355.5.
78 Georgetown Steel Corporation v. United States. (Federal Court of 
Appeals) 801 F.2d 1308.
79 Under the United States system the ITA determines whether the 
subsidy exists, whilst the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines 
the existence of injury. As explained above there was no need to petition the 




























































































to seek the imposition of countervailing duties on Czechoslovakian and 
Polish imports of carbon steel wire which they alleged were subsidized. The 
ITA held that Section 303 did not apply to nonmarket economies; 
antidumping law was the proper approach. The C1T reversed; the Federal 
Court of Appeals per Friedman, J., upheld the ITA, and reversed the CIT.
According to the Court of Appeals, the purpose of the United States 
countervailing duty law was to protect American firms from the unfair 
competitive advantage gained by a foreign government assuming part of the 
exporting producers expenses. The court then states: "In exports from 
nonmarket economies, however, this kind of "unfair" competition cannot 
exist." In making this statement, and in referring to the absence of a 
definition of "subsidy" in the Trade Acts, the court tacitly accepts the 
ITA’s definition of subsidy as "any action that distorts or subverts the 
market process and results in misallocation of resources, encouraging 
inefficient production and lessening world wealth".
According to the court, congressional intent, determined in part by 
the enactment of methods for determination of margins of dumping for 
nonmarket economies in the 1974 Trade Act, establishes that "any selling 




























































































under the antidumping law”. In this extraordinary judgement the court 
apparently did not consider that subsidy can result in sales at reasonable 
prices, or that apparently low prices may be the result of a comparative 
advantage. The court believed itself confirmed in its conclusion that 
countervailing duty law does not apply by the law’s silent failure to 




























































































III. THE SHIFT TO ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. The Economic Rationale of Antidumping Law and its Unsuitability for 
Nonmarket Economy Practices 
/. Introduction
Economic principles underpin GATT. Before directly considering the 
GATT legal problems caused by the shift from countervailing duty to 
antidumping law, it is useful to consider whether the economic rationales 
of antidumping law Tit more suitably the special situations pertaining to 
nonmarket economies than countervailing duty law.
2. The economic concepts o f antidumping law
Between market economies, and even within a single market economy 
"[T]here is more than a little controversy over whether the internationally 
sanctioned antidumping rules make sense economically."8" International 
antidumping law is aimed at the sale of products to other countries at 
prices below the cost of production, or at least below the domestic price. 
Davey states "There is no economic rationale for generally controlling this 80
80 J.H. Jackson and W.D. Davey, Legal Problems o f International 




























































































behavior",81 and goes on to show how these dumping practices are 
tolerated in domestic antitrust law, within certain bounds.
In contrast to the experts view, the popular perceived effect of 
international dumping is that it harms the producers in the importing 
country, directly by underselling and thus shrinking domestic producers 
market share, and indirectly by preventing domestic production growth, by 
directing consumer interest away from not directly competitive but similar 
domestic products, and finally by domestic user industry reliance on the 
undependable supply of dumped goods.82 This suggests a strong 
protectionist motivation (considered below83) in the use of antidumping 
law, but to the extent that this is economically vindicated, the Escape Clause 
and GATT Article XIX is more suited to deal with it.84
3. The question of unsuitability
One of the main publicly voiced concerns that justify the use of
81 W.J. Davey, Antidumping laws in the GATT and the EC, in 
Antidumping Law and Practice, edited by J.H. Jackson and E.A. Vermulst 
(1989), at 296.
82 Op. cit. Jackson and Davey (1986), 656-657.
83 Section III.D.2.




























































































antidumping law instead of escape clause relief appears to this author to be 
the fear of predatory pricing. But economists no longer consider predatory 
pricing, with a view to monopolistic gains, as viable. Indeed Horlick points 
out that whilst the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was alleging 
"predatory" dumping by the Japanese, the United States Supreme Court 
noted the unlikelihood of such behavior in an antitrust case.85 Specifically 
with respect to wheezing nonmarket economies, it can hardly be seriously 
considered that their goal is to squeeze out domestic producers to gain 
monopoly profits.
The whole history and thrust of antidumping law is to counter
"unfair’ market actions by strong private producers. One can almost
deduce a priori that the determination of a country as a nonmarket
economy would preclude the application of antidumping law to state
controlled exporters. The CIT held that to apply antidumping law to
nonmarket economy subsidies was to reach the following absurdity:
the more completely a government becomes involved in 
production and the more thoroughly it eliminates the possibility 
of internal reference to "market", in short the more perfectly 
it insulates production from normal economic reality the less 
likely it is to be "subsidizing."
85 G.N. Horlick, The United States Antidumping System, in Antidumping 




























































































Indeed there is a degree of correspondence between the factors listed in the
new Section 771(18)(B) added by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act to Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930,84 *and the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies annexed to the 1979 Subsidies Code.87
The practices of nonmarket economies invite application of countervailing
duty law. One can only conclude otherwise by making the sort of leap of
faith which Commerce made in Continental Steel:
even those incentives tied to export, some of which might be 
considered export subsidies in a market economy, do not, in our 
opinion, operate as export subsidies in an NME [sic].88
and which the CIT dismissed as "analytical legerdemain", but which the
Court of Appeals accepted in Georgetown Steel. Horlick states it plainly:
To the extent that antidumping rules were originally intended 
to regulate the price activities of private entities seeking to 
maximize profit (at least over the long term), they should not 
apply to NMEs where trading is not done by such entities.89
It is only against nonmarket economy countries that such a
84 Section I.B.3.Ü.
87 Compare, for example, factor (i) in the United States law with
illustration (b) in the Subsidies Code, factor (v) with illustration (d), factor
(vi) with illustration (1), and factor (iv) with the combined effect of the tax 
and credit subsidies illustrated in (e) through (k).
88 614 F.Supp. 548,552 (CIT 1985).




























































































contradiction of economics and such scheme of pretence could be 
unashamedly maintained as a system of law. If one did not consider the 
motivation behind the rules one might assume, as Gulliver did in his reply 
to the noble Houyhnhm:
that in all points out of their own trade, [lawyers] were usually 
the most ignorant and stupid generation among us... [tirade of 
invective continues...] avowed enemies to all knowledge and 
learning, and equally disposed to pervert the general reason of 
mankind in every other subject of discourse, as that of their 
own profession.9"
B. The Reasons for the Shift to Antidumping Law 
The CIT agreed with Gulliver:
The great irony of the Commerce Department’s approach is 
that while it gives the countervailing duty law a grandiose, 
theoretical objective, it destroys a significant part of its 
practical domestic purpose, [protecting domestic industry]
Yet international trade lawyers have outwitted these two masters of irony
(Swift and Watson, J.); for the motivation to rely on antidumping law was
to better protect domestic producers.90 1 Georgetown Steel and the increase
90 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, Penguin Edition 1985, p.297.
91 He who neighs last, neighs loudest. Previously to the recent increase 
in the need to protect domestic producers, there was not much call for the 
United States to apply its countervailing duty law to imports to nonmarket 



























































































in European Community antidumping proceedings92 against nonmarket 
economies were prompted by the advantages antidumping law has over 
countervailing duty law for the implementing country. The Director General 
of GATT, Mr. Arthur Dunkel, noted in his annual report in 1989 the 
increased interest in the subject of antidumping and "its importance as a 
trade policy instrument".93 It is the most frequently invoked trade policy 
instrument in the United States and the European Community. Australia, 
Canada, the European Community, and the United States between them 
initiated more than one thousand antidumping actions since 1980.94
48
The Director General stated that the scope of antidumping procedures 
had tended to become broader in recent years with the adoption of 
legislative or regulatory measures, and with changes in the methods used 
to determine whether dumping had occurred. From the Director General, 
these are heavy hints. The shift to antidumping law entails several 
advantages:
92 More than 50% of the European Community’s antidumping cases 
between 1970 and 1986 have been against nonmarket economies - J.F. 
Beilis, The EEC Antidumping System,in Antidumping Law and 
Practice,edited by J.H. Jackson and E.A. Vermulst (1989), at 42 - 43.
93 GATT Activities 1989, "International Trade Policy Developments in 
1989" (Geneva, June 1989) p. 17.




























































































a) It is naive to think that the non-application of countervailing duty
law to nonmarket economies places them in a more favorable position to
Western democratic market economy allies. At the time of Georgetown
Steel, the then deputy assistant secretary of Commerce for Import
Administration, Mr. Alan Holmer, remarked:
These decisions do not mean that nonmarket economy countries 
are being let off the hook with respect to our unfair trade laws.
The antidumping laws still apply to these countries.'’'
He continued ominously:
While in the Polish case we found that the countervailing duty 
law cannot be applied, we also on the same day found 
preliminary antidumping margins of nearly 60 per cent on wire 
rod from Poland. This shows that the antidumping laws can be 
effective in protecting U.S. companies from unfairly traded 
imports from nonmarket economy countries.95 6
In an interview after he had left the Administration, Mr. Holmer stated that
antidumping law had in fact often been opted for by domestic industry, and
continued:
The size of dumping margins in cases involving nonmarket 
economies over the last year or two underscores the viability of 
this option, that is readily available to petitioners.97
95 International Trade Reporter’s U.S. Import Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 31; pg. 
967 (9 May 1984).
96 Id.





























































































b) The methodology used in antidumping actions98 gives rise to 
higher duties, unrelated to market conditions.99 This is so as a rule, since 
countervailing duty law is tied more closely to market place criteria.100
c) Safeguard countervailing duty measures101 must in theory be 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis to all exporting countries, whereas 
antidumping duties can be levied against an individual exporting country, 
or an individual exporting firm.102
d) Whereas countervailing duty law extracts a fixed duty, 
antidumping actions can directly control the price at which the imported 
good is sold.103 Last year the Commission initiated for the first time an 
investigation under Article 13 (11) of the 1988 Regulation which allows for 
the imposition of an additional antidumping duty to compensate for the
98 Section IV.B.
991. Van Bael, Lessons for the EEC: More Transparency, Less Discretion, 
and, At Last, a Debate, in Antidumping Law and Practice,edited by J.H. 
Jackson and E.A. Vermulst (1989), p.405.
100 Op. cit. Horlick, (1989) p.102.
101 "Safeguard" in the sense that these measures are allowed not as a 
punishment against foreign practices but as compensation for domestic 
industry.
102 Op. cit. Beilis, (1989), p.43. See also I. Van Bael, in the same 
collection, p.405.
103 Op. cit. Horlick (1989), at 103. See also E.A. Vermulst, Have 
Antidumping Laws Become a Problem?, Michigan Journal of International 



























































































amount borne by the exporter.104 105 This in particular must be of 
questionable validity under GATT since the Panel decision of invalidity of 
Article 13 (10).1#s
e) In the United States since the 1988 Act,106 a private complainant 
can avoid a refusal to grant relief on "political" grounds.107 108* The 
antidumping law is both streamlined and non-discretionary.10x
f) As early as 1969 Jackson wrote that antidumping law can be "a 
protectionist device in disguise".100 With this shift front countervailing 
duty law, antidumping law now constitutes the best weapon against 
nonmarket economy exports.
Antidumping law as an offensive weapon of trade policy has replaced 
the defense instrument of countervailing duty law. It is often now used in
104 Woven polyolefin bags from China OJ (1991) C 157/5.
105 E.Vermulst, Commercial Defence Actions and other International 
Trade Developments in the European Communities 2 European Journal of 
International Law (1990) 166, 167.
106 But not in the European Community because of the "Public Interest" 
Rule - Article 12 (1) of the 1988 Regulation. See Section IV.C.5.
107 Op. cit. Horlick (1989), p.102.
108 E.A. Vermulst, Have Antidumping Laws Become a Problem?, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, p,767 Vol. 10 (1989)
100 J.H. Jackson and W.D. Davey, Legal Problems o f International 





























































































"fast track" proceedings merely to force a country in a weaker bargaining
position to accept a quota agreement.110 Provisions of the law allow
"prevention of circumvention" by increasing the duty even if the producer
lowers costs.111 Horlick sums up the situation in the United States:
The preference is quite clear among sophisticated trade lawyers 
in Washington, virtually all of whom seek antidumping relief in 
preference to any other form if it is perceived as "winnable". 
Consequently, while the U.S. apparently has the widest range 
of privately triggered trade actions, an antidumping complaint 
is still the weapon of choice.112
Antidumping law is the leader in the race to the bottom of unilateral 
interpretations of GATT principles in order to cope with trade from 
nonmarket economy countries.
C. GATT Dislikes Shiftiness
1. Meaning
(i) An unauthorized shift
The term "subsidy" as it applies in the export activity of a 
nonmarket economy does not present any real difficulties of 
"meaning"... If there are any difficulties here, they are not 
difficulties of meaning, but problems of measurement, which are 
precisely within the expertise of the agency [Commerce].113
110 Op. cit. Van Bael, (1989) p. 405.
111 E.g. Article 11 (4) of the 1988 Regulation.
112 Op. cit. Horlick, (1989) p.102.




























































































Crimes of property and violence are often combined. But a court cannot 
convict a man of battery when he has committed theft alone. Similarly, 
there is a preliminary GATT question mark over the application of 
domestic antidumping systems in the place of countervailing duty law, 
where a nonmarket economy country subsidizes an industry, but that 
industry does not engage in dumping as such, although its goods may be 
cheaper than the comparable domestic product. Dumping and subsidy are 
two different events, with different meanings. If the concept of subsidy and 
the remedy of countervailing duty law is more applicable to the practices 
of nonmarket economy countries than dumping and the remedies of 
antidumping law, than it is against the proper interpretation of the law (if 
not simply illegal) to apply antidumping law.
The confusion existing in the GATT Articles and Codes has been 
considered above.114 But it can be argued that this confusion is not itself 
enough to legalize the shift in the domestic systems of the European 
Community and the United States, who up to the last decade were content 
to apply countervailing duty law as well. In the first place, whilst the 
nonmarket economy countries are signatories to the Antidumping Code, 




























































































whether the provisions in the Subsidies Codells which attempt to treat 
antidumping and countervailing duty law interchangeably bind the 
nonmarket economy countries. The United States or European Communities 
might claim that since there are other signatories and since they themselves 
actively interchange these laws that non-signatories are bound under 
customary international law. A stronger argument could base itself on 
interpretation: the Code is merely declares the true meaning behind the 
confusion in Article VI of the General Agreement. However the thrust of 
this paper is that these provisions do not bind the nonmarket economy 
countries at all, and that the confusion in Article VI of GATT is an 
insufficient legal basis for the interchange of these remedies.15 16
Nonmarket economies are not treated as pariahs by the General 
Agreement.117 GATT is a multilateral instrument whose obligations 
depend on acceptance by the contracting parties. Just as in their relations 
with other contracting parties, the European Community and United States 
cannot under the Agreement create unilateral rights for themselves. To 
establish that GATT, which provides in Article VI and XVI for separate






























































































measures of antidumping and countervailing duty law,118 may so easily be 
interpreted by the minority of industrialist nations in the 1979 Subsidies 
Code for their own advantage, is to set a precedent for dissolution. It is to 
be noted that Commerce did not base their shift to antidumping law on the 
Code, nor were these provisions in the Code referred to in the 1979 Act. 
The ostensible reason was that the notion of subsidy, as defined by 
Commerce, has no meaning in a nonmarket economy. In December 1989 
the Council of GATT conducted a comprehensive examination of trade 
policies of the United States to launch the new Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism established by the Uruguay Round. During the course of this 
review Council member representatives pointed out to the United States 
representative that "there was no justification for the unilateral 
interpretation of the rights and obligations of contracting parties under the 
General Agreement".119 There is no room in GATT for a trade vigilante.
(ii) Disadvantages to nonmarket economies
Nonmarket economies may be disadvantaged by this shift in two ways. 
Firstly, both GATT and domestic rules on subsidies are suitable to be
55
118 Sections II.B.l.(i), II.B.2.(i).




























































































applied to nonmarket economies.120 Indeed as regards the United States 
law, the Supreme Court has stated that "a word of broader significance 
than "grant" could not have been used".121 Unlike subsidy, dumping is a 
concept economically unsuited to apply to nonmarket economies.122 
Because antidumping and countervailing duty law differ there is a risk of 
determination of dumping where there is no subsidy. The result is that a 
duty may be imposed in some cases though there does not exist either 
subsidy or dumping, but merely the legitimate practices of a nonmarket 
economy. (Market economies do have other remedies, such as Escape 
Clause Article XIX and Section 406 type proceedings if protection is 
needed123 ). Not only is the unilateral groundless imposition of duties an 
illegal increase in tariffs, but their selective application is also a denial of 
nonmarket economies MFN rights.
Secondly, the regime of antidumping law is harsher then that of 
countervailing duty law. All the "advantages" of an antidumping action
120 Section II.C.2.
121 Nicholas & Co. v. United States. 249 U.S. 34, 39, quoted in 
Georgetown Steel Corn, v. United States. 614 F.Supp. 548, 551.
122 Section III.A.3.




























































































admired by trade lawyers124 are disadvantages to the nonmarket economy 
which go beyond the response allowed by GATT for subsidies.125 One of 
the examples given above is that prevention of "circumvention" measures 
are more strenuous in antidumping cases.
Finally, one may question whether the countries under consideration 
qualify any longer as state-controlled economies, or have their reforms 
outstripped that concept at least in some industry sectors? It appears to be 
only a matter of time before this is unquestionably true.
2. Measurement
The CIT did not see the measurement of subsidy as 
insurmountable.126 After the shift to antidumping law, the calculation of 
foreign market value gives rise to special problems of GATT validity.127 
The first two problems arise in the context of a nonmarket economy 
practice which would formerly have been dealt with by a countervailing 































































































there is a problem of proportionality of response,128 if the calculated 
margin of dumping is greater than the would-be countervailing duty. 
Secondly, if the method of calculation of value in an antidumping action is 
more likely to result in a finding adverse to the nonmarket economy, than 
a countervailing duty action, then there is a problem of justification for the 
measure.
There is also the umbrella question of whether the special 
antidumping laws applied to nonmarket economies even if the practice 
constitutes dumping are within the parameters of GATT permissiveness of 
antidumping responses at all, bearing in mind that nonmarket economies 
are not to be treated any worse than "ordinary" contracting parties.
3. Conclusion
The shift is not going to be reversed on grounds of GATT legality 
alone. A consideration of the attitude of the United States to trade with 
nonmarket economies supplies background to the system currently in place, 
and suggests proposals for reform.
D. Attitude of the United States to Trade with Nonmarket Economies
58





























































































Give a dog a bad name and hang him. In the United States
nonmarket economy countries have always been linked to Communism, and
Communism has not been the flavour of the century. Nonmarket economies
are thought of as not taking their fair share of United States exports.12'*
The Cold War McCarthyism mentality at the root of the relevant United
States trade law1'10 has not yet changed its aspect in the governing
legislation. There remains a general assumption of illegality, a presumption
of guilt if you will, which translates into seeing dumping everywhere, and
antidumping law as an instrument of free (United States) trade:1'11
Dumping is... anti-free trade and is illegal under U.S. Law as 
well as the [GATT]. In short, sanctions against illegal dumping 
and for opening markets are pro-, not anti-free trade.112
This misapprehension is not confined to the media: Senator Heflin stated
simply " ‘Dumping’ is clearly unlawful".131 When Romania fell from grace
in 1988 during the Sixth Review under the Protocol of Accession the
129 Section I.B.l(i).
110 Section I.B.3(i).
111 Sections II.B.l(ii), III.B.
112 Malcom Baldbridge, "There Won’t Be a Trade War" quoted in J.H. 
Jackson, The World Trading System (1989), p.382, note 39.
111 Senate Judiciary Committee, The Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 




























































































Rumanian trade representative remarked on the exclusion of his country 
from the Generalized System of Preferences and the proposal to exclude it 
from MFN treatment that:
[s]uch developments were conducive to negative effects in 
bilateral trade relations and tended to institutionalize recourse 
to non economic criteria in order to introduce new obstacles to 
trade.134 135
2. Aggression and protectionism
This mistaken belief has lead to an aggressive protectionism, and to
plain aggression. Taking the latter first, the CIT accused the Commerce
Department of an attempt, which proved successful in the Court of Appeals,
of viewing the response provisions of the trade law as:
a means for influencing the way the wealth of the world is 
developed or the way other countries choose to allocate 
resources or organize production. This would be totally 
improper, and would be a dangerous distortion of the law. The 
countervailing duty law is not a tool of foreign policy.13’
GATT Council members remonstrated with the United States during the
recent Trade Policy Review that "there was no justification for unilateral
action aimed at inducing another contracting party to bring its trade
134 35 BISD 1988, p.343, paragraph 22.




























































































policies into conformity with the General Agreement".136
As regards aggressive protection,137 138former Commerce official Mr. 
A. Holmer responded to criticism of not being sufficiently aggressive: "Do 
we vigorously enforce the law? Absolutely."1311 Section 157 of the Trade 
and International Policy Reform Act of 1987 Bill was introduced into the 
House of Representatives to overturn the Court of Appeals ruling in 
Georgetown Steel to increase protection of United States industry: "it is not 
the intent of the Committee to allow for nonmarket economy countries to 
be completely exempt from the countervailing duty law."139 In the Senate, 
Senator Heinz stated of the altered version of the Bill, the Omnibus Trade 
Act of 1987, that:
the bill reported by the Committee once again misses an 
opportunity to attack unfair trade practices more aggressively 
through reforms of our antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws. They address unfair trade practices - market distorting 
practices nations have committed not to engage in through their 
signing of the GATT Codes.140
136 GATT Activities 1989 (Geneva, June 1990), p.28.
137 Section III.A.2.
138 International Trade Reporter Vol.2. No. 32; Pg 1016.
139 Report o f the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R.3. 100th 
Congress 1st Session (1987), House Report 100-40, Part 1.
140 Comments of Senator John Heinz, Report of the Senate Committee on 




























































































He combined self-contradiction: "These laws are not punitive statutes", 
with self-delusion: "Thus these laws are ultimately market reinforcing 
because they encourage nations not to subsidize and companies not to 
dump".141 The United States makes much more use of antidumping 
actions than any other trading country, including the European Community 
which is the world’s largest trading entity.142 Columbia recently 
complained that the United States was using its antidumping law as a 
reaction against comparative advantage.143
3. Ways and means
Mr. Horlick, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import 
Administration, began his submission to the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
Committee on Ways and Means by asserting that the administration had 
implemented the import laws "aggressively", and then hit on one of the
Congress, 1st Session (1987)., p.268 at 269.
142 See the Annex to the Report of the Committee on Antidumping 
Practices [established under the Antidumping Code], L/6609 45 BISD 1989 
p.435, and other annexes in the Annex to this paper.
143 The United States preliminary decision doubled the antidumping 
duty on Columbian flowers. Columbia stressed that it was the ideal soil and 
climatic conditions which gave them price competitiveness, and it questioned 
the methodology used by the United States in determining the new dumping 
margin. Columbia further maintained that the United States action was 




























































































primary motivations behind the shift, retaliation:
The biggest foreign subsidy... is import protection overseas, 
high tariff barriers, and we do not find that a countervailing 
duty. Under the GATT rules it isn’t... If Congress wishes to 
change this it is obviously a fairly complicated matter because, 
quite candidly, we protect a lot of industries. We have import 
barriers.144
One year later the Court of Appeals reversed the CIT in Georgetown Steel, 
and the legislature began passing "aggressive” bills around. What better 
way to have your cake and eat it, whilst reforming communists at the same 
time, than to use a specialized antidumping law?
144 "Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws", Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means o f the House 




























































































IV. RESPONSES TO NONMARKET ECONOMY EXPORTS:
ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. Principles of Antidumping Law
1. The GATT antidumping rules
(i) Background
In particular, the General Agreement does not impose on 
contracting parties the obligation to prevent enterprises from 
dumping. - GATT Panel, 1984.145
At the time of the World Economic Conference of 1933, national 
antidumping laws were of as much concern as dumping itself. The revival 
of unilateralism in domestic antidumping law theory146 is a regression 
back to this troubled time. GATT law has been principally concerned from 
its inception147 to the present day with controlling antidumping responses, 
not at all with outlawing dumping. The Surveillance Body established by 
the current Multilateral Trade Negotiations oversees the commitments made 
in the Punta del Està Ministerial Declaration148 on the "standstill" of 
restrictive measures. There are several specific commitments:
145 GATT, BISD 30 Supp. 140, 164 [1984],
146 The increase in unilateralism is noted in J.H. Jackson and W.D. 
Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Second Edition 
(1986), p.102.
147 Section IV.A.l.




























































































- no new trade restrictions inconsistent with GATT.
- no new trade restrictions which go further than necessary to remedy 
specific situations provided for in GATT.
- no trade measures taken to improve negotiating positions.149
The increasing application of antidumping law in the place of countervailing 
duty law to nonmarket economy exports can be seen as a breach of ail three 
commitments.
(ii) Article VI
Article VI of GATT provides:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which 
products of one country are introduced into the commerce of 
another country at less than the normal value of the products, 
is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to 
an established industry in the territory of the contracting party 
or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.
Then in Article VI(2) comes the allowed response:
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party 
may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not 
greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of 
such product. For the purposes of this Article, the margin of 
dumping is the difference determined in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1.
(iii) The antidumping codes
149 GATT Activities 1988 (Geneva, June 1989), p.138. Annex 1: Trade 
Negotiations Committee Mid-Term review Agreements, Part 1 Negotiations on 




























































































There are in fact two antidumping codes. The first was negotiated 
under the Kennedy Round of GATT trade negotiations (1962-1967),159 
important in this context as proof that the primary concern of GATT 
contracting parties as a whole has been the limitation of anti-dumping 
practices and procedures of governments which were damaging 
international trade.150 51 For all practical purposes the Tokyo Round Code 
has superseded the 1967 Code since all of the 1967 Code signatories bar 
Malta have signed the new Code, which contains an explicit denunciation 
of the 1967 agreement.152
The "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" has been signed by Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, though not by Cuba. Article 
2(1) of that Code retains the definition of dumping in Article VI(1) of the 
General Agreement.
2. The United States antidumping rules
150 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, GATT, BISD 15 
Supp.24 (1968).
151 J.H.Jackson, The World Trading System (1989), p.226.





























































































The Antidumping Act of 1916 provided a civil cause of action in 
Federal court for private damages as well as for criminal penalties against 
parties who dumped foreign merchandise in the United States.15'1 The 
evidentiary requirement of intent is so difficult to meet, however, that this 
statute is a dead letter. Congress passed the Antidumping Act of 1921 which 
provided the statutory basis until 1979 for an administrative investigation 
by the Department of the Treasury of alleged dumping practices, and for 
the imposition of antidumping duties.* 154 It also supplied the source for a 
United States draft article which became the basis for GATT Article VI.
In 1954 the function of determining injury was transferred to the U.S. 
Tariff Commission, now the International Trade Commission, whilst the 
determination of sales at less then fair value remained with the Treasury 
Department. The Trade Act of 1974 was the first legislation to penalize 
below-cost sales. This was accepted internationally in the 1979 GATT 
Antidumping Code, and is now common. The United States, then, has often 
been at the forefront of an expansion in the scope of antidumping law.
151 Act of September 8, 1916, ch.463, sec.801, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. 72.





























































































Congress approved the revised antidumping code - product of the 
Tokyo Round - under section 2(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,155 
Title l of which act repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921 and added a new 
Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930, ostensibly in implementation of the 
provisions of the GATT Agreement. The responsibility for making dumping 
determinations was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the 
Department of Commerce in 1979.156 Further amendments followed in 
Title VI of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,157 and Title I, subtitle C, 
part 2 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.158
(ii) The basic provisions
Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,159 
provides firstly in Section 731(1) that the Department of Commerce must 
make a determination that "a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, 
or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value". Secondly,
155 Public Law 96-39, approved July 26, 1979.
156 Reorganization Plan No.3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69273 (Dec. 3,1979); 
and Exec. Order NO.12188, January 2, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 989.
157 Public Law 96-39, approved July 26, 1979.
158 Public Law 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
1S,19 U.S.C. 1673; P.L. 71-361, as amended by P.L. 96-39, P.L. 98-573, 




























































































under Section 731(2) the International Trade Commission (an independent 
body) determines that "an industry in the United States is materially 
injured, or is threatened with material injury" by such dumping. The 
antidumping and countervailing duty law share the same standard of injury 
defined in Section 771(7) as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, 
or unimportant".160 The petitioner must establish dumping, injury, and 
a causal connection between the two. If both these determinations are 
positive, an anti-dumping order is issued which imposes anti-dumping duties 
equal to the margin of dumping.161
3. The European Community Antidumping Rules 
(i) Background
The remark is often made that though the European Community has 
invoked its antidumping rules against nonmarket economies far more often 
than the United States, it has attracted far less criticism. One commentator 
suggests that this may be due to the rules greater simplicity and
160 19 U.S.C. 1677; P.L. 71-361, as amended by P.L. 96-39, P.L. 98-573. 
P.L. 100-449, and P.L. 100-647.
161 The structure of determinations in the countervailing duty law, 





























































































(ii) The basic provisions
Article 2(A) sums up the principles neatly: an antidumping duty may 
be applied to any dumped [where the export price is less than the normal 
value] product whose release for free circulation in the Community causes 
injury. Article 2(B) contains provisions on normal value, and what 
constitute the ordinary course of trade. These are not so important in this 
context because, just as the European Community determines status by 
legislative list,163 theoretically unlike the United States case by case 
approach,164 there is no opportunity to try to apply the ordinary rules for 
calculation of margins, again unlike the United States law.165
B. Calculation of Value
The calculation of values is at the center of the antidumping systems, 
and is the heart of the changes in the law applied to nonmarket economies. 
This is so because, as the principles of law in the last section demonstrate,
162 E.A. Vermulst, Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States 































































































dumping is defined in terms of values. In contrast, subsidies have remained 
often illustrated, but never defined. It is in the rules on calculation of value 
that many of the protectionist retaliatory attitudes above166 find 
expression, and it is in their application that many of the advantages of 
antidumping law are sought.167
1. GATT rules
(i) Article VI methods
Article V (1) provides that a product is dumped if it is:
introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its 
normal value if the price of the product exported from one country 
to another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in 
the exporting country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for 
export to any third country in the ordinary course of 
trade, or
(ii) the cost of production in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable addition for the selling cost and profits, 
[constructed value test]
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in 
conditions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for 
other differences affecting price comparability.






























































































cases where the State has "a complete monopoly of its trade and where all 
domestic prices are fixed by the State" [my emphasis] that there may be 
difficulty in determining the comparable domestic price, and if this is the 
case contracting parties "may find it necessary to take into account the 
possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country 
may not always be appropriate" [my emphasis]. So the stress in the original 
GATT Article on when "special" methods of value determination may be 
used is heavily on necessity in exceptional circumstances.
Article 2(4) of the Code expands on how the margin of dumping may
be calculated where there is difficulty in determining normal value, as is the
case with nonmarket economies:
When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary 
course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country 
or when, because of the particular market situation, such sales 
do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping 
shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of 
the like product when exported to any third country which may 
be the highest such export price but should be a representative 
price, or with the cost of production in the country of origin 
plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and any 
other costs and for profits. As a general rule the addition for 
profit shall not exceed the profit normally realised on sales of 
products of the same general category in the domestic market 
of the country of origin.
In sum, the law of GATT allows a contracting party which is considering 




























































































purpose of establishing the existence of dumping by making only reasonable 
additions for extra costs. Furthermore, costs for profits must be both 
reasonable and less than or equal to those ordinarily realised.
(ii) The requirement of fairness
The primary concern is fairness. Code Article 2 (6) provides further:
In order to effect a fair comparison between the export price... 
and the price established pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VI:l(b) of the General Agreement [the normal value established 
under one of the tests], the two prices shall be compared at the 
same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in 
respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time.
Article 8(3) reiterates the requirement of Article VI(2) of the General
Agreement that the anti-dumping duty not exceed the margin of
dumping,168 but Article 8(1) goes further, mirroring its counterpart
provision Article 4(1) of the Subsidies Code:
It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in all countries 
or customs territories Parties to this Agreement, and that the 
duty be less than the margin, if such lesser duty would be 
adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
The overriding principle that anti-dumping measures must be controlled,
fair, (and non-discriminatory) is clear from Article VI paragraphs 1, 2, 5,
and 6 of the General Agreement, and Articles 2 paragraphs 4 and 6, and





























































































domestic antidumping law and procedures for the calculation of value. It 
was stressed in the Uruguay Round Review of MTN Agreements and 
Arrangements that:
There was a tendency to abuse the right to take measures 
against dumping.... [Participants] considered that stricter rules 
governing the conditions under which these measures can be 
taken and more precise ways of calculating antidumping 
margins should be elaborated.169
2. United States rules
(i) Case by case choice of method: "normal" methods
The determination of whether "less than fair value" (LTFV) sales 
exist within the meaning of Section 731(1), in order to establish the margin 
of dumping, is based on a comparison of foreign market value with the 
United States price. As regards nonmarket economies a close reading of the 
statutes shows that the determination of comparable value is only made by 
a separate methodology if the home market or export sales do not permit 
a determination of foreign market value.170 However the determination of 
a country as a nonmarket economy already means that "sales... do not
169 GATT Activities 1989 (Geneva, June 1990), p. 57.




























































































reflect the fair value [of the products]".171 Though it thus appears to be 
a pointless exercise under the statute as well as under the Regulations,172 *
nonetheless, Commerce first looks to calculate foreign market value 
according to three methods under Section 773(a) in order of preference, and 
declining order of accuracy. The first is home market sales (i.e. domestic 
consumption),175 the second is third market sales (the price of the 
merchandise exported into a third country),174 and the third, referred in 
Section (a)(2) to section (e), and which applies only when neither of the first 
two options is available, is constructed value.
(ii) Factors test
When Commerce is unsuccessful under these possibilities in Section 
773 (a) then, since the sales do not permit of proper comparison. 
Subparagraph (c) provides a special method for the determination of 
foreign market value. Under paragraph (1) the method to be used is the 
factors of production test, which is:
On the basis of the factors of production utilized in producing
171 Section 771 (18)(A) of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, supra 
Section I.B.3(ii).






























































































the merchandise and to which shall be added an amount for 
general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, 
coverings, and other expenses, as required by subsection 
(e).175
This factors of production test replaced in 1988 the former surrogate 
producer test.176 However the philosophy behind the changing tests remains 
constant. It was well illustrated before the 1988 Act by ICC Industries v. 
U.S.177. where an antidumping duty was imposed retroactively on a United 
States importer. The Court of Appeals held that the Chinese exporter was 
dumping because the unit price of the merchandise (potassium 
permanganate) was 40 per cent less than that of the domestic product. This 
case suggests that the guiding factor is whether or not the nonmarket 
economy exporter is undercutting domestic producers. The factors of 
production test now stands as the fourth method of evaluation in order of 
preference. The surrogate producer test which is prevalent in the European 
Community is retained as an exception.178 It is to be noted that nowhere 
is this test, unlike the surrogate producer test, specifically mentioned in
175 19 U.S.C. 1667b, Section 773 (c)(1)(B).
176 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988, Section 1316, 
amending Section 773 (c) of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
1671).
177 812 F.2d 694 (United States Court of Appeals) affirming Watson, J., 
in the Court of International Trade.
178 Section 1316 of the 1988 Act inserted this as subsection (c)(2) of 




























































































GATT or in the Codes.179
(iii) Evaluation of costs
The market economy chosen for valuation of factors is that 
"considered to be appropriate" by the Department of Commerce, hardly an 
unpolitical body.180 As the nonmarket economies develop it may become 
easier to determine foreign market value according to one of the three 
methods referred to in Subsection (a). The factors of production test is itself 
already linked to the determination of constructed value, taking into the 
sum all the costs therein mentioned. The big difference is that in the case 
of nonmarket economies these costs are assessed in a foreign, 
"appropriate", market economy country, and not in the country of export. 
Paragraph (3) of Subsection (c) gives a non exhaustive list of the factors of 
production to be considered: the hours of labor, the raw materials, the 
amount of energy and other utilities, and the representative capital cost. 
This approach appears more "scientific" at least on the surface than the 
former surrogate producer test181. Yet the test must still be run according 































































































regarding the values of such factors in a market country." This rule can 
seriously distort in practice the results of any test which depends on it.
(iv) Evaluation of expenses
The amount for general and other expenses is set out in section (e) - 
the provision for determination of constructed value. General expenses, 
according to Section 773(e)(1)(B) "shall not be less than 10 percent of the 
cost as defined in subparagraph (A)". Subparagraph (A) is the cost "of 
materials... and of fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in 
the producing of such or similar merchandise... in the ordinary course of 
business." The cost of materials and fabrication is one of the "other 
expenses" referred to in Section(c)(l)(B). The last additional cost is the cost 
of containers, defined in Section(e)(l)(C).
(v) Comparison with United States price
The United States price is that of each import sale, whereas foreign 
market value, whether based on home or third country prices, represents 
the weighted average of prices in the period under investigation. The term 
"United States price" is defined in Section 772 as the purchase price 
(paragraph (b)) or the exporter’s sale price (paragraph (c)). Paragraphs (d) 




























































































duties, taxes, and transportation expenses.
3. European Community rules
The Preamble of the 1988 Regulation refers to Article 113 (EEC),
Article VI (GATT), and then states:
Whereas it is desirable that the rules for determining normal 
value should be presented clearly and in sufficient detail;
Whereas it should be specifically provided that where sales on 
the domestic market of the country of export or origin do not 
for any reason form a proper basis for determining the 
existence of dumping, recourse may be had to constructed 
normal value.
Unlike the US, the European Community regulation does not consider 
outside of the Preamble the possibility of the application to NMEs of the 
usual method of determination of normal value (the comparable price 
actually paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade for the like product 
intended for consumption in the country of origin.)1"2 Article 2 (5) 
provides:
5. In the case of imports from non-market economy countries, 
and in particular those to which Regulations (EEC) No 1765/82 
and (EEC) No 1766/82183 apply, normal value shall be 
determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable manner on 
the basis of one of the following criteria:
(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy 
third country is actually sold: 182*





























































































(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that country; or
(ii) to other countries, including the Community; or
(b) the constructed value of the like product1114 in a market 
economy third country, [my emphasis]
Subparagraph (c) is a fallback - the price payable in the Community for the
like product. So the choices differ from the United States: first choice is
surrogate producer, second is constructed value, and third is the exception,
Community prices. This was confirmed by the European Court of Justice
in Technointorg v. E.C. Commission and E.C. Council; the European Court
of Justice went on to state that:
The aim of that provision is to prevent account being taken of 
prices and costs in nonmarket economy countries which are not 
normally the result of market forces.1*'''
C. GATT Problems
1. The four possibilities'*1’
The four possible GATT violations that may arise from the 
interchange of trade remedies are: 18456
184 "Like product" is defined in Article 2 (F) (12) as a product which is 
identical to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a 
product, a product which has characteristics closely resembling those of the 
product under consideration.
185 Technointorg v. E.C. Commission and E.C. Council, [1989] 1 





























































































i) In a case where there is in fact no subsidy, but where a suspect 
nonmarket economy practice is tested by antidumping, if the method of 
calculation of value results in establishing a margin of dumping, then the 
imposition of a special duty in response is not a trade restriction justified 
or excepted under GATT, but is prohibited by it.
ii) In a case where the nonmarket economy practice is more suited to a 
response through the antisubsidy law, if the method of calculation of value 
results in the imposition of antidumping restrictions which are greater than 
the countervailing duty restrictions which would otherwise have been 
imposed, then this is a breach of GATT prohibitions of restrictions greater 
than the amount of the subsidy.
ii) Even if the nonmarket economy practice may properly be suspected of 
constituting dumping rather than subsidy, which situation will become more 
likely as nonmarket economies evolve and private firms have more freedom, 
yet the domestic antidumping law produces a finding of dumping where 
none could "GATTly" or reasonably be said to exist, the imposition of 
restrictions is not justified or excepted under GATT, and is thus prohibited 
by it.
iv) In the same situation, but where dumping does exist, if the calculation 
of values results in establishing a margin greater than the margin which 



























































































GATT, then this is a breach of GATT prohibitions on the imposition of 
restrictions greater than the margin of dumping.
Since there is no consensus on whether the domestic antidumping laws 
of the European Community and US breach GATT, nor any court 
determination on the matter, one may only highlight some particulars of the 
calculation of value to show how arbitrary and unjust a system it is, the 
product of the attitudes and motivations discussed above, which should be 
denounced by GATT as illegal.
2. General reasonableness
Commentators have pointed out that GATT vagueness has lead to
unilateral interpretations which have facilitated findings of dumping and
expanded remedies.187 Though this writer agrees in the result, the cause
is not so much GATT vagueness, though such exists,188 but in deliberate
aggressive use of rules both offensively and defensively to mask bargaining
power differences. Davey states:
Antidumping duties may afford protection to domestic industry 
in an appropriate amount, but there is no reason to expect 
them to do so. So in the vast majority of cases prices will be






























































































raised under circumstances where there is no justification for 
the amount of such increases.18’
It has been stated above189 90 that the principle of reasonableness runs 
through the GATT antidumping provisions. Consequently methods common 
to both European Community and United States systems such as the 
addition of expenses,191 the comparison of an average with a single 
price,192 and the stress on "not unreasonable” in the place of 
"reasonable", and "appropriate" in the place of "fair",193 bring these 
domestic systems into disrepute. The disreputability of domestic systems can 
only exacerbate the contentiousness of the use of such laws as instruments 
of trade policy and the dispute about their legitimacy.194
189 W.J. Davey, Antidumping laws in the GATT and the EC, in 
Antidumping Law and Practice#dited by J.H. Jackson and E.A. Vermulst 
(1989) at 299.
m  Section IV.B.l(ii).
191 Sections IV.B.2(iii) and (iv).
192 Section lV.B.2(iv).
193 Section IV.B.3.
194 The question of legitimacy has been highlighted by the GATT Panel 
report, adopted by the Council, which determined that the 
anticircumvention measures taken under Article 13 (10) of the 1988 
Regulation (the screwdriver amendment) violated inter alia Article III (2) 
of GATT, and was not justified under Article XX (d) - E.Vermulst. 
Commercial Defence Actions and other International Trade Developments in 





























































































There have been several recent challenges to determinations under the 
1984 Regulation on the same grounds which will arise under the 1988 
Regulation. Technointorg provides an example of unreasonableness in 
practice. Although Technointorg argued that Russian wage levels and 
component costs gave it a comparative advantage not reflected in the 
country of comparison, the European Court of Justice held that a fair 
comparison required that no further allowances be made beyond those in 
the governing Regulation.'1'5 In Sermes SA v Directeur des services des 
douanes de Strasbourg one of the questions of validity raised by Article 177 
(EEC) reference concerned the misuse of powers by the Council in adopting 
a definitive antidumping duty on electric motors from Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR.19* The court 
rejected the claim that the Council had been guided not by the Community 
interest but by the interest of the French industry in question.
The situation in the United States was summed up by Mr. G. 1956
195 Technointorg v. E.C. Commission and E.C. Council, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 
281, at 300. The law in question was Articles 2(9) and (10) of Regulation 
2176/84.
196 Case 323/88 [1990] ECR 3027 concerning Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 864/87 of 23 March 1987.The importer also asserted, unsuccessfully, that 





























































































Horlick, then a Commerce official, in an interview: "The results of these 
cases have nothing to do with reality. They are just random, and you could 
do just as well with a roulette wheel.... The problem is getting worse".197 
Mr. A. Holmer, also a former Commerce official, has stated that it is 
"exceedingly difficult to achieve a fair and predictable result for the parties 
involved."198 A specific illustration of both the unpredictability and the 
general unreasonableness of the United States law is given by ICC 
Industries v. United States, referred to above199, where the CIT upheld the 
ITA’s retroactive penalization of importers of nonmarket economy products 
because, according to the court, the importers had a reasonable opportunity 
to change their actions. Such rulings necessarily have a "chilling effect" on 
trade with nonmarket economies; not only are nonmarket economy 
producers "charged" with the alternate "crime" of dumping, of which they 
are promptly and without discretion convicted by aggressive roulette 
players, but the domestic importers may also be retroactively punished.
3. Accuracy o f tests
197 International Trade Reporter’s U.S. Import Weekly, Vol. 8, No. 8; Pg 
292, (25 May 1983).






























































































The United States nor the European Community inadequately deal 
with problems arising from soft currencies. Neither system takes into 
account the real value of hard currency exports to a nonmarket economy. 
Valuation of costs in market economy terms forgets that such costs are not 
paid for in hard currency. The European Court of Justice, considering an 
Article 173 claim for annulment of a Commission Regulation imposing a 
provisional antidumping duty on USSR imports in which Yugoslavia was 
taken as the surrogate, would not take into account that the official 
exchange rate for the Yugoslav dinar was double that paid by Community 
banks.200 Community the disregard for
(i) United States law
Even the International Trade Administration acknowledged that the 
methods before the factors of production test were inadequate: "the most 
important issue in the antidumping area today is how to make the 
antidumping law more administrable and more predictable for nonmarket 
economy country cases".201 An example of the unfairness of the surrogate
200 Joined Cases 305/86 and 160/87 Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v 
Commission and Council of the European Communities [1990] ECR, 
concerning Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86, and applying Case 
255/84 Nachi Fuiikoshi v EC Council [1987] ECR 1861.
201 Testimony of Gilbert B. Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 




























































































producer test as used by the Administration is China National Metals & 
Minerals Import & Export Corporation v. United States. There the Court 
per Tsoucalas, J., upheld the choice of the Department of Commerce of a 
basket of countries to use as analogue, despite Chinese manufacturer’s 
petition that information from India was available. The countries in the 
basket were Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. 
So much for taking macroeconomic factors into consideration. The Chinese 
exporter asserted with justification that this was the "least preferable 
method".202
The theory behind the United States approach is that but for the 
nonmarket character of the economy, the nonmarket economy producers 
would incur the same costs and maintain the same prices as producers in 
market economies with comparable GNP per capita. Mr. Horlick believes 
that this approach is weakened by how it defines comparability in the rules 
of the various tests, and by the assumptions it makes as to the role of a
the Committee o f Ways and Means of the House o f Representative and its 
Subcommittee on Trade on Bill H.R.3 referred to above.
202 China National Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corporation v. 
United States. 642 F. Supp. 1482, 1483 (1987) (CIT). See also Urea from 



























































































particular industry on the economy as a whole.203 But a more 
fundamental objection is that the "but for" test is simply too big a but to 
allow accurate predictions on what would be the case if a nonmarket 
economy was completely different to what it is.
Even though the surrogate producer method is now exceptional in the 
United States, the factors of production test (first used by administrative 
fiat in Electric Golf Carts from Poland) is not a solution. Though some 
commentators consider it a better method,204 the matter is not simple. The 
rate of turnover of different tests suggests that the factors test will itself 
only last a few years, to be replaced by a different set of rules producing 
equally harsh results and achieving the same aggressive protectionist aims. 
On the one hand, if the economy is really a nonmarket economy, "the price 
and cost data are probably meaningless, including the quantities of inputs 
used, since no market is determining those variables"205 The inputs 
themselves might differ in a market economy because of availability.
The same administrative problems which resulted in, for example, the
203 Op. cit. Horlick and Shuman, 18 Int’l Law. 807 (1984).
204 Op. cit. Vermulst (1989) at p.790, and p.804.





























































































establishment of fair value of imports of Urea from Romania on the basis 
of prices of commodities in the Netherlands and labor rates established by 
public information from the United Kingdom, are ever present in the 
application of the factors test. In a recent preliminary review of 
antidumping duties on antifriction bearings from Romania, the ITA 
determined Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Yugoslavia, and South Africa 
to be comparable to Romania in economic development.286 The ITA 
increased the duty relying, because of the unavailability or unusability of 
the data, on publicly available Eurostat data, a readily accessible 
administrative fallback having no other virtue. In the "Sparklers from 
China" case in comment 2 the heartily fed up respondents urged Commerce 
to obtain "more legally and factually defensible surrogate country 
information".206 07 The determination imposed an antidumping duty.
(ii) European Community law
The validity of the imposition of antidumping duties, provisionally by 
the Commission and definitively by the Council, under the 1984 Regulation 
has been the subject of several challenges.208 The arbitrariness of the
206 56 FR 11190 (15 March 1991)
207 56 FR 20588, 6 May 1991.




























































































selection of analogue countries to establish normal value according to 
Article 2 (5)(a) of the 1988 Regulation is illustrated in the investigation 
Roller chains for cycles from China.209 For the purposes of the previous 
proceeding the Commission had chosen Spain as the analogue country, but 
since Spain had become a Member State of the European Community 
before the proceeding in question, the Commission decided to choose Japan 
instead. China and Japan are simply not comparable. The prices in the 
United States have been used to determine normal value for exports to the 
Community from China and the former Soviet Union.210 In Paint, 
distemper, varnish and similar brushes from China a dumping margin of 
over 90% was found based on prices in Sri Lanka, where there were just 
two producers, one of which was owned by a Community firm.211
The European Community ostensibly focuses on countries whose 
microeconomic development, such as in production processes and scale, in 
the industrial area under investigation is comparable. But like the United 
States concern for macroeconomic comparability, the matter is not
209 OJ (1988) L 115/1.
210 Calcium metal from China and the Soviet Union OJ (1989) L 271/1 
(definitive); Barium Chloride from China and the German Democratic 
Republic OJ (1989) L 227/24 (provisional).




























































































determinative. In Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission of the
E.C.212 the European Court of Justice upheld the determination of the 
Commission under Article 2(5) of the 1979 Regulation213 (reproduced in 
the 1988 Regulation), which used Hong Kong as the surrogate country. 
Timex, represented by the Brussels law firm of Van Bael & Beilis, made a 
strong argument that the Commission had produced an "optimal", and not 
a "normal", value to compare with the price of the imports. The Soviet 
timepiece industry (the exporters) had a complete cycle of production, 
unlike in the surrogate country, Hong Kong. The Commission combined 
the advantages of technology in France with the availability of cheap labor 
in Hong Kong where the watch movements were assembled, thus achieving 
an artificial cycle of production not possible in reality, since technological 
advance and cheap labor are not found together in one country. The 
European Court of Justice simply stated that the use of this artificial and 
unfeasible construct was within the wide discretion the Commission 
possessed in the assessment of values.
In the last resort Article 2 (5)(c) of the 1988 Regulation provides for 
the calculation of normal value based on prices in the Community. In one
212 [1985] ECR 849, [1985] 3 CMLR 550.




























































































case, when it became necessary to switch from the United States as 
surrogate in the provisional determination to Community prices in the 
definitive determination, the dumping margin increased from 46% to 
50%.214 The first time Community prices were used to establish normal 
value was in Oxalic Acid from China and Czechoslovakia, where the 
Commission based normal value on the prices of the producer who had 
requested the review.215 In another case the two producers involved, one 
German and the other Chinese, were the only ones in the world.216 
Another example is provided by a Council Regulation of July 1990,217 
where the dumping margin was determined by comparing the import price 
to the Community price established on the basis of information available in 
Eurostat. The duty imposed was not even ad valorem but was a specific 
duty "in order to remedy the continuous price decrease of the Chinese 
imports".
214 Barium chloride from China OJ (1991) L 60/1.
215 OJ (1988) L 343/34.
216 Pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics from China OJ (1990) L 174/27. 
A price undertaking was accepted. See also Silicon metal from China OJ 
(1990) L 80/9.
217 Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90, imposing a definitive antidumping 
duty on imports of silicon metal originating in the People’s Republic of 





























































































The provisions on additional costs and reasonable additions are used 
to increase the "normal" value as much as possible. For example, there is 
a United States statutory requirement218 that constructed costs must 
include 10% for administrative overheads and 8% for profit, though this 
figure is economically unfeasible in times of slack demand, and so is 
doubtful under Article 2(4) of the Antidumping Code.219 In Comment 5 
appended to the final determination of sales at less than fair value in Urea 
from the Socialist Republic of Romania220 the petitioner argued that 
general, administrative, and selling expenses had been assessed unfairly 
since the 10 per cent statutory minimum must at least individually value the 
elements in these expenses. The Department of Commerce nonetheless 
maintained that these expenses may be calculated without reference to 
specific factors or components of these expenses in Romania, and instead 
determined the expenses involved in production and distribution of urea on 
the basis of those normal in the United Kingdom. Such expenses are of 
course not related to those in Romania.
218 19 U.S.C. Section 1677b (e)(1)(B).
219 Section IV.B.l(ii).





























































































Discretion in the antidumping laws may of course be exercised to 
make up for shortfalls in the law, a sort of administrative equity, considered 
in the next subsection. However discretion also allows for corruption221 
and uneven application of the law, in particular to the detriment of weaker 
interests. The nonmarket economy countries are in this situation. Some 
industries in the United States have used the antidumping laws as levers for 
securing quotas through voluntary restraint agreements. In the event of 
agreement on voluntary restraint, surprise!, the administration does have 
discretion to suspend proceedings.
In the European Community, the Public Interest Rule and the fact 
that restrictions are in the end imposed by regulation of the Council of 
Ministers, is at least honest in admitting the political nature of 
determinations, and allows a measure of control and adaptability now so 
badly needed. The European Community is very aware of the function of 
the Public Interest rule; Mr Andriessen in an answer on behalf of the 
Commission stated:
The Commission considers that it is in the general interest of 
the Community that its antidumping policy is well balanced and 
takes into account not only of the European Community




























































































producer’s interests but also of the Community’s role as the 
world’s most important trading partner. This is why the 
Community’s antidumping legislation contains a public interest 
test, which is a unique feature of the European Community 
legislation-222
6. The Lesser Duty Rule
The rationale of the antidumping duty (at least ostensibly), is to 
protect domestic producers from the harm caused by unfairly priced 
products.223 Article 13(3) of the European Community 1988 Regulation 
takes up the prompt in Article 4(1) of the GATT Subsidies Code and 
Article 8 of the Antidumping Code: the duty (antidumping or 
countervailing) "should be less [than the margin of dumping or size of the 
subsidy] if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury". The 
European Court of Justice has interpreted the "should" as "shall".224
The European Community Commission enjoys considerable discretion 
in its analysis of the injury margin, which may be used to inflate dumping
222 QXW0075/90EN (11 April 1990).
223 F.G.Jacobs, Observations on the Antidumping Law and Practice o f the 
European Community, And Some Possible Reforms, in Antidumping Law and 
Practice,edited by J.H. Jackson and E.A. Vermulst (1989) p.354.



























































































margins in order to compensate for the lesser duty rule.225 However the 
Commission applies as standard practice the injury margin maxim to duties 
on imports from nonmarket economies.226 Also, Article 2 (9)(a) of the 1988 
Regulation provides for various adjustments to ensure a fair comparison 
between normal value and export price.
96
In any event, although the lesser duty rule practice does go some way 
to remedying GATT problem (d),227 a practice does not make up for a 
default in the system of rules. It is also the Commissions practice to apply 
the rules on nonmarket economies to any industry in any of the countries 
in the legislative list, and to disregard claims that liberalization and 
freedom from state control should make the exporter subject to the 
"normal" antidumping rules.228 The situation is worse in the United 
States, which inflates margins as much as the European Community, yet
225 Op. cit. Vermulst (1989) p. 781.
226 Espadrilles from China OJ (1990) L365/25 (lprovisional), OJ (1991) 
L 166/1 (definitive); Barium Chlorid; from China OJ (1991) L 60/1 
(definitive); Pure silk Typewriter Ribbon Fabrics from China OJ (1990) L 
174/27 (provisional), OJ (1990) L 306/21 (definitive). Op. cit. Beilis (1989) 
p. 57.
227 Section IV.C.(i).
228 Op. cit. Beilis (1989) p.782. Similarly the Commission always applies 
the normal rules to nationalized industries in market economies. This 
practice may have been influenced by the presence of many such industries 




























































































does not have this saving provision. That said, the Commission’s most 
common approach is to dispense with the duty once it has served to help 
negotiate an advantageous voluntary price undertaking by the nonmarket 
economy exporter. Over one period, out of 82 positive determinations 
regarding nonmarket economy imports, sixty ended in such agreements, and 
the remaining twenty two were terminated before completion.229




























































































V. A TIME FOR CHANGE 
A. Proposals 
1. Benchmark test
The idea of a benchmark test is that an artificial pricing standard is 
established as the benchmark for determining if nonmarket economy 
imports are being sold below value. Several possibilities for this standard 
have been proposed by Senator Heinz: for example the lowest price in the 
United States market;230 or the price of the largest importer.231 The best 
version of this proposal would be a four step process: first, establish injury; 
second, see if "normal" antidumping and countervailing duty rules can 
apply; third, if this fails test the import price of the product exported from 
the nonmarket economy with the benchmark price; fourth, if the import 
price is below the benchmark price, impose a corresponding duty and do 
not consider whether it is subsidized or dumped.
However there are serious flaws with the various benchmarks 
suggested. Horlick concludes the search for a satisfactory benchmark to be 
impossible.232 The proposals were even rejected in the 1988 Omnibus
230 S539, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. section 5008a(l) (1987).
231 S1420, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. section 325(a)(1987).




























































































Trade and Competitiveness Act. The benchmark test effectively punishes 
nonmarket economy countries for failure to come under "normal" 
antidumping rules, that is, for their status. Most importantly, there is no 
authority under GATT for such a test. The benchmark test avoids the 
question marks over the legitimacy of the change from countervailing duty 
law to the exclusive use of antidumping law. It is a carrot and stick 
approach; nations are not donkeys.
2. Standardization
A proposal that is gaining increasing currency is to standardize 
domestic antitrust and foreign international trade law approaches.233 
Though the proposal means well - to end hypocritical application of a less 
rigorous standard of trading fairness to domestic producers than to foreign, 
particularly nonmarket economy producers - the vision is still insular. 
Whilst there is much to be said for the honesty of approach involved in 
each country harmonizing the standards of fairness applied domestically 
with those applied internationally, the result would be quite the opposite 
from standardization between nations: the proposal in fact assumes that




























































































economies should be standardized.2'14
B. A New Proposal: The Rules 
/. Interface through rules
214 Professor Zeisman of the Berkeley Round Table on International 
Economic Affairs (BRIE) strongly propounded in commenting on this paper 
an argument in vogue especially in the United States. In this author’s view, 
the argument boils down to the following: if countries with non-conforming 
economies wish to be part of the GATT system, they must enter on market 
economy terms. If they do not wish to be part of GATT, fine; 80 per cent 
of world trade is controlled by the Big Three (the European Community, 
the United States, and Japan) and is market economy driven. The global 
trading system will consist of GATT plus an assortment of collateral 
negotiated agreements to cover those nations which would not, or could not, 
make it. The advanced industrialized countries can continue with the 
business of making wealth in their own way.
There is now a coincidence, for the first time, of technological, 
political, and economic abilities which is capable of shaping a world 
economic system. Is its basis to be the pursuit of self-interest? a division of 
labor on the global level with all those attendant evils? Riots in inner cities 
can be suppressed; to suppress riots on a global scale will require a stick 
bigger than the world can safely use.
Professor Zeisman, motivated by the same concerns, strongly 
advocates aid and development, but as collateral international economic 
arrangements. This looks very much like global social welfare. Why put a 
system in place which will result in a high proportion of the world’s 
population becoming dependent on this support. How can a "level playing 
field" be justified when so many players are sickly and will not have an 
equal opportunity to compete? The rationale of survival of the fittest is 
naturally advocated by the fittest.
The humiliating difficulty the USSR experienced before dissolution, 
begging to borrow money to buy food, exemplifies the unlikelihood of a 
powerful trading system being tempered by the self-interested benevolence 
of the self-interested. There is no human achievement in the economic goal 
of the globalization of market inequalities. A world trade system must value 
the equality of different national systems in a structure of rules which does 




























































































Although some are tempted to use GATT membership... to try 
to force different national economic systems to change, it can be 
argued strongly that GATT has a responsibility to change and 
to figure out an appropriate way to accommodate the different 
economic systems.235
Some interface mechanism may be necessary to allow different 
economic systems to trade together harmoniously.236
One should also recall the ideas of universalism underpinning the
International Trade Organisation charter.237 Solutions as simple as those
expounded in the section above belie the complexity of the interface
problem. Nonmarket economy countries have a different status to other
countries and a set of different legal standards greet their imports. In this
system is included varying methods for the determination of values within
their territories, which methods appear doomed a priori since if the concept
of value has meaning in these countries, special rules are not necessary,
whereas if it lacks meaning, methodology in calculation serves primarily as
a cover or excuse for the restriction to come.
The shift of focus from subsidy to dumping, and from countervailing 
duty to antidumping law, whichever came first, and whatever about the
235 Op. cit. Jackson (1989) p. 290.
236 J.H. Jackson and W.D. Davey, Legal Problems of International





























































































legality or illegality of this shift under GATT, was only possible since the 
international economic legal system is not a system wherein legal rules 
control, but one where legal rules disguise - legerdemain, as Watson, J. said. 
Members of the Council of GATT voiced concern during the Trade Policy 
Review of the United States that: "the United States trade system was based 
on a structure of laws, agencies, and public hearings [whose] very 
complexity reduced the transparency of trade policy formulation and 
administration.’238
The proposal below returns to the concept of subsidy and the use of 
countervailing duty law. In the European Community this switch would be 
possible by administrative decision of the Commission to apply the existing 
law, but in the United States, since Georgetown Steel was based on a 
judicial interpretation of the meaning of legislation, a reversal of the 
judgement is called for. This could be achieved by the courts via cases 
pressed strongly by the Department of Commerce (in the way the 
judgement of the Federal Court of Appeals in Georgetown Steel was 
created), or by Congress. If this is thought to be an impossible proposal 
then consider why was countervailing duty law thought to be the theoretical 
norm until the 1980’s, and why else would the 1979 Subsidies Code have




























































































provided for this option in Article 15(1) and (2)?
2. Back to the Future I  
(i) Suitability
The suitability of the GATT countervailing duty law structure has 
already been mentioned.239 Yet the European Community, whilst not 
determining as a matter of principle that countervailing duty law is 
inapplicable to nonmarket economy exports, as a matter of practice relies 
on its antidumping law.240 The first United States countervailing duty law 
was enacted in response to subsidized sugar imports from Russia in 1897. 
Yet (only since 1984) the United States law has shifted exclusively to 
antidumping law to treat nonmarket economy exports. Even in the ITA’s 
preliminary determination in the case which became Georgetown Steel it 
drew on the arguments and briefs in a countervailing duty investigation 
which was then ongoing but was dropped before completion. It was 
concluded in that investigation of the import of textiles, apparel, and related 
products from the People’s Republic of China,241 on "the weight of
239 Section II.B.2(ii)(a).
240 See comments of P.D.Ehrenhaft, International Trade Reporter’s U.S. 
Import Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 6; pg. 22 (9 November 1983).




























































































informed opinion", and on "a narrow reading of the Act" which "by its 
terms, applies to ‘any country, dependency, colony, province, or other 
political subdivision of government’", that nonmarket economy exports 
were covered by the countervailing duty law.
The motivation for the shift has been discussed above,242 but what 
is at its technical root is a different definition of the concept of subsidy. 
When the ITA made its final determination in Carbon Steel Wire Rod from 
Czechoslovakia243 it adopted a definition confined solely to concepts of 
profit and market process.244 The decision in that case amounted to a self- 
fulfilling prophecy; quite consistently with its terms, the ITA determined 
that such a definition could not be applied to nonmarket economies. But 
this definition is certainly not mandated by GATT and is arguably 
inconsistent with it, since the GATT subsidy rules which do not regulate the 
imposition of restrictions are concerned with the state help of exports, and 
are not confined to solely market and profit concepts in interface rules. A 
subsidy can be identified without exclusive reliance on such concepts, since 
where such exists government action treats one group preferentially so that
242 Section III.B.





























































































that group receives a bounty relative to other groups in the same country.
During a hearing called by the ITA on the question of whether 
countervailing duty law was applicable to nonmarket economies,24-' 
Senator Thurmond pointed out that the legislation does not exempt a 
country because of the type of government it maintains. In regard to the 
subsidy granted to Chinese textile exports he remarked that a special 
settlement rate allowed exporters to exchange hard currency at a rate 43 
per cent higher than the official rate which was clearly a countervailable 
benefit. The Bank of China openly referred to this rate as the "subsidy 
rate". Senator Heinz reaffirmed that the countervailing duty law was 
intended to have the "broadest possible applicability"; the single distinction 
with regard to nonmarket economies was the absence of an injury 
requirement. Ehrenhaft agreed that there was no conceptual reason why the 
countervailing duty law should not apply to nonmarket economy countries. 
Indeed precedent for the application of countervailing duty law to state 
controlled economies can be found in the interwar period, when it was used 
against Nazi Germany, and before the Bolshevik revolution when there was 245
245 International Trade Reporter’s U.S. Import Weekly (9 November 




























































































significant trade with czarist Russia.246
The principal relevant difference between nonmarket economy 
countries and market economy countries, leaving aside political questions, 
is the degree of State involvement. If this difference suggests to market 
economies the opportunity for special trade law rules, state control also 
connotes subsidy, not dumping. Though few types of subsidy are actually 
prohibited, and none that nonmarket economies have agreed to, GATT 
sanctions relief actions quite readily. This has the advantage that relief may 
be sought even where the subsidy does not result in dumping. If there is 
dumping without subsidy, one must question how far the state can be 
controlling the exporter and domestic prices, which suggests that, quite the 
opposite of the system now in place, dumping is a concept better adapted 
to market economies.
(ii) Estimation of subsidy 
(a) Measurement
The definition of subsidy espoused by the United States domestic law 
relies on the existence of commercial benchmarks in order to measure the 
subsidy in terms of prices, thus making the calculations at least as difficult




























































































as those involved in the calculation of the dumping margin. If the
preferential treatment model of subsidization is adopted the problem of
estimation in nonmarket economies is not insurmountable:
All that will be needed in these cases will be the normal 
operation of central control and the exceptional or 
disproportionate or unfair event.... Its potential difficulties do 
not justify the exception to the law sought to be made in this
247case.
The "potential difficulties" are certainly no greater than is currently the 
case in the application of the antidumping law. Ehrenhaft has pointed out 
that the surrogate methodology for the calculation of value can be 
adapted;247 48 at least what is to be measured will be identifiable apart from 
the measurement. The greater conceptual suitability of countervailing duty 
law may make measurement easier: Senator Heinz believed that in the 
Chinese textile imports case the subsidy can be "easily measured as the 
difference between the preferential exchange rate and the normal rate."249
Professor Barcelo of Cornell Law School has criticized the approach 
advocated in this paper on the ground that any GATT response to 
nonmarket economy trade practices requires a market economy outcome as
247 Op. cit. Judgement of the CIT in Continental Steel.
248 ITA Hearings, U.S. Import Weekly, (1983) Vol. 9 No. 6, p. 226.




























































































a benchmark to serve as an indicator of government intervention. Professor 
Barcelo points out that to look at a particular government policy which in 
a market context would appear to grant preferential treatment would not 
disclose whether it is indeed preferential treatment in the nonmarket 
economy. Consequently, one cannot determine whether there is preferential 
treatment against a benchmark which does not exist. However this 
argument, like the final decision in the Georgetown Steel, is self-fulfilling. 
A purely free market concept of subsidy is by defintion meaningless in a 
nonmarket economy context. The GATT does not mandate a market 
economy benchmark for dealing with nonmarket economy products either 
by its provisions or in the light of its role as an interface mechanism in a 
world system. Rather the workings of different economic systems need to 
be understood, and their relative internal effects quantified simply in terms 
of benefit and detriment within those systems to particular industries, 
rather than creating market values by the artificial superimposition of a 
market economy schematic.
The LTA went so far as to acknowledge, in the preliminary 
determination to Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, that the government 
currency retention scheme constituted a subsidy under Annex A of the 



























































































alleged benefits to not constitute a bounty or grant".250 To estimate a 
nonmarket economy subsidy the ITA realizes that "our traditional tools - 
prices - are of questionable value", but do not consider that such tools are 
not mandated under GATT but rather may have to be modified to avoid 
GATT problems.251 Certainly there is no authority for the exclusive use 
of such tools when this would result in the deprivation of rights under 
GATT. The ITA admits that since 1890 the identification of benefits has 
been "based in part on differential treatment of an industry or a group of 
industries within that country".
(b) Sector approach
"Sector approach" has two meanings. Firstly, it is a requirement of 
United States law that government intervention, to be the subject of 
countervailing duty law as a subsidy, must be specific on its face or in its 
application to an enterprise, an industry, or groups thereof.252 Secondly, 
it is advocated here that imports from market economies should be 
considered according to the economic sector of origin, not according to the
109
250 49 FR 6773.
251 Section IV.C.
252 PPG Industries Inc v United States Judgement of Federal Court of 




























































































blanket status of nonmarket economy. Since the nonmarket economy
countries under consideration are fast approaching a sufficiently free
market in certain industries to retain market benchmark techniques for
their products, it may be possible to use a sector approach in deciding
whether special or "normal" subsidy estimation techniques are appropriate.
In determining the amount of the subsidy, a sector approach is more
suitable than considering the economy as a whole. In this approach the
industrial sector whence the allegedly subsidized exports originated is
analyzed in order to see if the amount may be calculated after the manner
of such calculations for market economies.253 Vermulst, considering this
approach in the calculation of dumping margins, claims that:
a pure sector approach is a dangerous over simplification of 
economic realities because it does not take into account the 
constant interaction between micro-economic and 
macroeconomic realities.254
However subsidies by their nature operate on this borderline. The 
European Community considers sectors only in determining whether the 
relevant prices in the surrogate country are market determined, or whether
253 If the amount cannot be so calculated, the approach outlined in
subsections (a) - measurement - and (c) - notification - of this section are of 
course available.




























































































they are fixed by the State or subject to a total or near-total monopoly.255
The United States in theory considers in each case the sector of origin of the
exports to determine whether the ordinary methods of calculation of
domestic price can apply. In practice the United States also eschews a sector
approach; indeed the ITA in its final determination in the Czechoslovakian
Steel Wire Rod case stated that the issue of the applicability of the
countervailing duty law was a jurisdictional question, and under the statute
law the jurisdiction did not extend to imports from nonmarket economy
countries.256 In Four "H" Corporation v. U.S.257 the CIT upheld the
ITA’s treatment of imports from the Chinese canned mushroom industry.
The ITA took the transaction between the export agency and the U.S.
importer to be the import price even though the agency, China National
Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (CEROILS)
was not a manufacturer or producer within 1677a(b). The plaintiffs argued
that the correct transactions were those between the Chinese canneries and
the CEROILS, but the court held:
Plaintiffs concede that the People’s Republic of China economy 
is state controlled. They must concede, therefore, that the price 
between the canneries and CEROILS is state controlled to some
255 Op. cit. Neotype Techmaskexport.
256 M.Ligh, 80 A.J.I.L. 359 (1986).




























































































degree. If it is state controlled to any degree it is not a reliable 
price when compared to prices set entirely by market 
forces.258
One wonders what such reasoning would mean for imports from certain 
state dominated sectors of market economies if it was there applied; there 
is no doubt that the judgement leaves little room for a sectoral approach in 
United States current trade practice.
In March of 1989 the question rearrose when the ITA asked whether 
it was possible to isolate a specific product sector and find it sufficiently 
market oriented that domestic prices could be used to determine whether 
dumping exists.259 That September the Commerce Department released 
a report concluding that a sectoral approach in antidumping law (no 
mention was made of countervailing duty law) could be applied to 
nonmarket economies in transition to greater market orientation which 
would analyze a specific sector apart from the country’s larger economic 
scenario.260 Nonetheless, in two decisions more recent than this report 
Commerce has demonstrated its continuing hostility to such an approach.
258 Id. at 983 (emphasis added).
259 54 FR 12941.



























































































In Chrome Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China,261 the 
respondent claimed that regardless of Commerce’s view of the PRC macro­
economy, the chrome plated lug nut sector was sufficiently market oriented 
to permit the ITA to determine fair market value under Section 773(a) of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 (U.S.C. 16736). The ITA remarked that "in every 
case conducted by the Department, it has treated the PRC as a nonmarket 
economy" and that since the government was involved in steel output, no 
sectoral approach could apply. The second of these reasons could apply to 
every steel industry worldwide to a varying extent, and the first reason 
simply rejects the case by case approach imbedded in the statutory rules.
.fr
The ITA also refused to apply ordinary rules of identification and 
estimation in the final determination of sales at less than fair value in 
Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China.262 The Department of 
Commerce restated their theoretical position (and the rule on the burden 
of proof) in response to a comment by the respondent: "nonmarket 
economy countries are entitled to separate, company specific margins when 
they can demonstrate an absence of central government control, both in law 
and in fact, with respect to exports". Evidence supporting ("though not
26156 FR 15857 (18 April 1991).




























































































requiring") the sectoral application of normal rules includes the absence of 
restrictive business stipulations on the exporter’s business, and 
decentralization of companies both in law and in de facto absence of 
government control. These evidentiary requirements are increasingly 
fulfilled by the nonmarket economy countries under consideration. This 
position should be implemented in practice, not just restated in theory.
(c) Notification
The sector approach if adopted ought to be combined with a stress 
placed on the notification obligations in GATT Article XVII (4)(c) and
(d) .263 These obligations, unlike the many false assumptions at the root of 
the current system,264 265are real. Compliance will especially help importing 
countries to judge the existence and amount of subsidy if, because of State 
control of an industrial sector, market economy calculation methods are 
insufficient, having regard however to the exposition of GATT Article VI(1) 
contained in the Interpretative Note.26' Moreover, a willingness on the 
part of nonmarket economies to supply information (easy to secure in these 
































































































to use it, will avoid the horrendous inaccuracies which result from the 
administrative difficulties in gathering information from comparable market 
economies (due to their natural reluctance) and the consequent application 
of the best evidence rule. This combined proposition also allows for the self- 
correcting / case by case approach imbedded in the United States law which 
is in theory to be applied to the determination of status and the calculation 
of values.266
A recent Decision of the Contracting Parties arising from action taken
by the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee established a "Trade
Policy Review Mechanism" which may be used to stimulate use of
notification.267 The objectives of this mechanism are:
To contribute to adherence by all contracting parties to GATT 
rules, disciplines and commitments, and hence to the smoother 
functioning of the multilateral trading system by achieving 
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade 
policies and practices of contracting parties. Accordingly the 
review mechanism will enable the regular collective 
appreciation and evaluation by the Contracting Parties of the 
full range of individual contracting parties trade policies and 
practices and their impact.268
266 Section I.B.3(ii) and (iii); Section IV.B.2(i).
267 GATT BISD 36 1988/89 p.403.




























































































This review mechanism removes the excuse, so far as it is based on 
ignorance, that it is not possible to estimate a subsidy in a nonmarket 
economy. Under Section B contracting parties must provide reports 
whenever there are changes in their trade policies, as well as an annual 
update of statistical information. These requirements chime with the Article 
XVII and other GATT notification obligations: "Information contained in 
the country reports shall to the greatest extent possible be coordinated with 
notification made under GATT provisions". Some of the descriptions which 
must be supplied are the evolution or existence of sectoral trade policies, 
their economic goals and significance. 269 The policy behind the decision 
is to improve adherence to the actual GATT rules, as distinguished from 
fictional ‘extras’ in the ‘spirit of GATT’ or ‘fairness’ in the appropriated 
sense of those words.
(iii) The requirements of injury and MFN
The reversion to countervailing duty law will not cause the United 
States to lose its grandfather rights, and thus it need not implement a 
requirement of injury,270 though the European Community must. Some 
form of injury requirement is desirable, since its absence in Section 303





























































































proceedings results in an imbalance in favour of domestic producers. There 
are two principal advantages. Firstly, there is no risk of losing the case on 
account of a negative injury determination by the International Trade 
Commission, who are institutionally more independent than the 1TA. 
Secondly, Petitioners avoid the time and expense which detailed injury 
information and answering ITC questionnaires impose, not to mention the 
additional expenses of separate proceedings at the ITC.271 An injury 
requirement as a precondition to the application of countervailing duty 
remedies to nonmarket economy subsidized imports would not overburden 
the petitioner because of the wideness of the United States definition of 
material injury, which includes harm that is not immaterial or 
inconsequential.
The acceptance of an injury requirement could be traded off against 
an agreement, similar to that contained in the Protocols of Accession 
concerning Article XIX relief, that the restrictions once subsidy and injury 
are established, may be implemented selectively against nonmarket
271 A.F.Holmer and J.H.Bello, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #7: The 




























































































economies.272 Such an agreement could be concluded bilaterally with all 
the nonmarket economies here considered and the European Community 
and the United States. It would only cover situations where the "normal" 
rules were inapplicable, and would provide that as the nonmarket 
economies evolve these "normal" rules will be applied automatically. 
Alternatively the nonmarket economy countries may be induced to sign the 
Subsidies Code which would automatically deprive the United States of 
grandfather rights in their regard. In return the antisubsidy law contained 
in that Code could be applied against nonmarket economy signatories in the 
place of antidumping law.
As in the European Community, the imposition of the restriction in 
the final instance should be discretionary. The politics involved is then at 
least brought out into the open where, since there is no question of 
imposition of a duty not allowed by the rules, it can only act permissively. 
For example, the Commission has been viewed as reducing antidumping
118
272 There is some inconsistency between a requirement of injury and 
selective imposition, since the only legitimate reason for looking to injury 
is to asses the existence and degree of harm whose remedy is the concern 
of the restrictions. There is no perfect solution to interfacing 




























































































activity as a measure of indirect aid.273 
(iv) The red economic menace.
Horlick advocates that the best solution is the implementation of an 
"injury only" market disruption clause.274 In this writer’s view such 
actions will only be necessary in the unforeseeable future after the 
nonmarket economy countries have emerged from market reforms. Indeed 
it appears from recent events to be axiomatic that the East European 
nonmarket economies can only be in a position strong enough to rapidly 
increase exports, and so cause enough market disruption to fall under these 
special nonmarket economy provisions, if they cease to be nonmarket 
economies! Often in the last few years the nonmarket economy countries 
could not even fill the quota allocated to them by the European Community.
One wonders how many safeguards market economies need, since 
they already have economic advantage, and since it is their theory of trade 
liberalization that underpins GATT. It is easy to forget that the phrase 
"level playing field’ fails to refer to the game: the European Community
273 Kennedy and Webb, Eastern Europe and the European Community, 
1990 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p.633 at 638.




























































































and the United States are setting the rules in MTN codes and have all the 
biggest and most able players.275 However to stress the possibility of an 
increased use of measures already on the books in both the European 
Community and the United States will serve a psychological function in 
reassuring protectionists and "trade hawks".
(a) The rules
The Council Regulation on common rules for imports from State­
trading countries276 provides for protective measures in Title V.277
275 Romania’s recent trade history provides a good example of this 
game. Credits to pay for western economies exports led to crippling debt. 
Only by restricting their market and concentrating on exports did the 
national economy recover. See A. Lekovesk, U.S. Romanian Trade: Foreign 
Debt, Trade Barriers, and Future Problems and Prospects, Law and Policy 
in International Business 1989 Vol. 1, p. 71.
276 (EEC) No 1765/82, OJ No L 195, 5.782.
277 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 (OJ No L 252/1) on the 
strengthening of the common commercial policy with regard in particular 
to protection against illicit commercial practices might be used as an 
additional mechanism, but it is too aggressive for a buffering or interface 
role although it does have a benefit in that it focuses on removing the injury 
and thus not with an evaluation of how far prices differ. Nevertheless it has 
two characteristics of doubtful worth: its aims are too general, and it 
eschews all classification of nonmarket economy practices as either subsidy 
or dumping.
Article 1 provides:
This Regulation establishes procedures in the matter of 
commercial policy which, subject to compliance with existing 
international obligations and procedures, are aimed at:




























































































Article 11 states that where a product is imported into the Community:
in such greatly increased quantities or on such terms and 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause substantial injury to 
Community producers, and where the interests of the 
Community require immediate intervention... may alter the 
import rules for that product by providing that it may be put 
into free circulation only on production of an import 
authorization... under Article 12.
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974278 is entitled "Relief from 
Market Disruption by Imports from Communist Countries". The Section 
applies to imports from communist countries whether or not they are 
contracting parties. Section 406 provides a lower standard of injury 
causation then sections 201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974, which will be an 
additional boost to those still wary of the red menace.279
removing the injury resulting therefrom;
(b) ensuring the full exercise of the Community’s rights with 
regard to the commercial practices of third countries.
However to label nonmarket economy trade efforts as illicit commercial 
practices, defined in Article 2 as "any international trade practices which 
are incompatible with international law or with generally accepted rules" 
is to codify the prejudice against nonmarket economy countries that this 
paper argues against.
278 Public Law 93-618, approved January 3, 1975, and amended by 
section 1411 of the Omnibus trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public 
Law 100-418) 19 U.S.C. 2436.




























































































Under the definitions Subsection (e)(2)(A) of Section 406 market 
disruption exists whenever "rapidly" increasing imports of a product are 
a "significant cause of material injury, or threat thereof" to domestic 
industry. Under subsection (e)(2)(B)(i) the rapidly increasing requirement 
is defined widely to include any significant increase, actual or relative to 
domestic production, during a recent period of time. Subsection (e)(2)(B)(ii) 
states that the cause need not be equal to or greater then any other cause. 
The International Trade Commission is allowed to consider in making a 
determination of market disruption "evidence of disruptive pricing 
patterns", or any other efforts to "unfairly manage trade patterns".280
The ITC is to conduct its investigation upon the filing of a petition by 
inter alia any trade association, firm, union, or group of workers which is 
representative of an industry,281 so the private sector retains its right to 
initiate actions. The Commission must complete its investigation in 3 
months, including a public hearing.282 The Commission finds the amount 
of duty or other restriction necessary to remedy the market disruption (note
280 Subsection (e)(2)(C)(iv).
281 Section 406 (a)(1) referring to section 202(a) of the Trade Act of
1974.




























































































the difference in language: not the amount necessary to offset the injury or 
counter the subsidy), and submits this along with its report to the 
President.283
(b) The remedies
Article 12 provides for discretion in responses:
1. The Council may, in particular in the situation referred to in 
Article 11 (1), adopt appropriate measures...
The only limitation is appropriateness, which in typical European
Community and civil law fashion gives as much freedom in a word of
discretion as the United States law accomplishes by a list. The response may
even "be limited to imports intended for certain regions in the community"
(Article 11 (2)). Quantitative restrictions are a normal response.
In the United States the President under subsection (b)(2)(A) may 
take any action authorized under sections 202 and 203, described as actions 
to facilitate positive adjustment to import competition. Such responses allow 
the President to impose or increase in tariffs, quantitative restrictions, to 
negotiate orderly marketing agreements, to impose an import license 
regime, to submit legislation benefitting domestic industry, and to




























































































implement trade adjustment measures.™ Relief applies only to imports 
from the subject communist country and lasts for a period of five years, 
subject to a three year renewal. The discretion cuts both ways. Until 1984 
every case where the ITC found injury under Section 406 the President 
refused a remedy. In one case where he had withheld relief, after the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan the President reinstituted an 
investigation on the same facts on which he had just denied relief.284 85
C. A New Proposal: The Approach 
1. Introduction
The improvement in the position of nonmarket economies which the 
above proposal would bring about are partly technocratic: rapprochement 
proceeds as quickly as the nonmarket economies succeed with market 
reforms. This is partially how the nonmarket economies view their own 
position, but they seek western help to make that change, and have accepted 
the chronology of macroeconomic, then microeconomic, restructuring which 
facilitates aid.286 If the proposal is confined to domestic rule changing
284 Section 203 (a)(3)(A-J) of the Act of 1974.
285 Op. cit. Horlick and Shuman (1984) p.807.




























































































alone, it will be incomplete. The nonmarket economies would have reason 
to share Beilis concern:
My worry is that any alternative to this system (for example 
some form of selective safeguards) would not necessarily be less 
protectionist.287
Although the domestic trade law systems in the United States and the 
European Community have many similarities, the European Community’s 
general strategy or "holistic" approach to the economic changes in Eastern 
and Central Europe differs radically from that of the United States. For 
example, in the Seventh Review of Trade with Hungary under the Protocol 
of Accession288 the United States representative referred to "reducing the 
role of central planing in economic decision making and reducing subsidies 
to inefficient enterprises"; "much more needed to be done", the 
representative continued, "in these and other areas if Hungary was to 
become the sort of market oriented economy on which the GATT system is 
based."289 The representative in the same breath thus demonstrated the 
United States unwillingness to interface through anything other than their
287 Op. cit. Beilis (1989) p. 97.
288 Report by the Working Party on Trade with Hungary, adopted on
19 July 1989 (L/6535) BISD 45 p.416 (1989).




























































































own standards, whilst simultaneously admitting that subsidies exist in the 
nonmarket economy countries, which subsidies the Department of 
Commerce maintains are conceptually meaningless. The view expressed by 
the European Community’s representative contrasts; he refers to the EEC’s 
trade and economic cooperation with Hungary, and remarks that the 
reforms "augur well for a fuller integration of the Hungarian economy in 
the GATT family and the world economy",290 and suggests that Hungary 
be one of the early candidates for trade policy review.
2. Beyond antidumping and countervailing duty law: the bilateral treaty 
program o f the European Community
Despite, or perhaps because of, the rapid pace of bilateral agreements, 
the European Community’s system of antidumping law remains in place. 
This was expressly affirmed by Article 23 of the Implementation 
Agreement. The proposals on rules made in this paper must still be 
addressed.
However bilateral agreements are changing the framework of Trade 
with Eastern and central Europe. The European Community program 
reaches beyond its domestic laws; it is supplying the investment needed for




























































































restructuring the economies and infrastructure, and making agreements 
which will in the long run result in the European Community’s 
accumulation of all the major benefits. Under the first generation of such 
agreements the focus was on the reduction on the one hand of the European 
Community’s quantitative restrictions and on the other the liberalization of 
the nonmarket economies import licensing systems. The second generation 
of such agreements were primarily a reiteration of GATT obligations 
arising from the General Agreement and the Protocols of Accession. These 
trade and commercial cooperation agreements gave a firm commitment to 
abolish quantitative restrictions by an early date (which other GATT 
contracting parties had removed since 1975).
The European Community has extended extra time to these three 
states to dismantle tariffs. Furthermore it will allow cumulation in its rules 
of origin: in future, a product exported for example from Poland, but using 
components from Hungary or Czechoslovakia will nor be considered any 
less "Polish" for purposes of duty-free entry into the European Community. 
The European Community’s attentions are not limited to these three states. 
The European Community and the former USSR signed a ten year 
agreement on trade and economic cooperation which includes a mutual 



























































































abolish quantitative restrictions by 1995.291 The Council passed 
regulations on emergency food aid for Romania,292 and concluded a 
cooperation agreement with Romania for trade, commercial, and economic 
cooperation.293
The Dublin Summit (June 1990) approved the extension of the Poland 
/ Hungary Assistance for Economic Restructuring to Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Poland and Hungary were 
in a more favorable position than other East European GATT contracting 
parties. The PHARE program has overtaken the second generation of trade 
agreements; it combines trade concessions and aid, and investment 
opportunities and political commitments to multi-party elections.
PHARE includes food aid, for example a Commission decision granted 
31m ECU to Poland and 20m to Romania in December 1990.294 The 
European Community has also pledged to provide fifty per cent of the
128
291 18 December 1989.
292 OJ No L 31/1, 2 February 1990; OJ No L 48/1, 24 February 1990.
293 OJ No. L79, p. 12, 26 March 1991.
294 Six Financing Decisions Concerning Economic Assistance to Certain 




























































































Group of 24 economic assistance to Central and Eastern European 
countries.29-' But much of the money goes to strategically planned 
programs, such as those for the modernization of the infrastructures for 
foreign trade,296 for support mechanisms for private sector initiatives to 
set up joint ventures,297 and for technical assistance programs.298
The links do not stop at agreements and joint projects. The 
Community listed Poland and Hungary as beneficiary countries in their 
Generalised System of Preferences for the first time in 1990. Yugislavia had 
been previously listed.299 Jacques Attali, the President of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) spoke of that institution 
as "third generation". GATT, along with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, are first generation structures.100 Its 
charter stipulates that its purpose is to support transition in Central and
29' Press Release, Brussels, 30 January 1991.
296 Id.
297 Phare, Brussels, 30 January 1991.
298 Id.
299 E.Vermulst, "Commercial Defence Actions and other International 
Trade Developments in the Europan Communities" 2 European Journal of 
International Law (1990) 166, 167.




























































































Eastern Europe to market economies. These countries are full members of 
the Bank. The United States supplies only ten per cent of its capital, 
compared to fifty one per cent coming from the Member States and directly 
from the European Community (and six per cent from the Soviet Union).
The goal for these Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is 
membership of the European Community. Poland has dismantled all 
quantitative restrictions and reduced duty rates to farm and industrial 
products to five per cent. A GATT working party has been established to 
consider the renegotiation of the terms of Poland’s GATT membership 
which impose not only MFN obligations but also the obligation to increase 
imports by seven per cent per annum.301 President Havel of 
Czechoslovakia has expressed his country’s hope to be member by the end 
of the decade. Progress in integration has left the United States standing. 
First came the ageements with the European Economic Community on 
trade, commercial, and economic cooperation.302 The Protocols with the
301 GATT Activities (1990, Geneva) p.131. The sanction is suspension 
of GATT privileges, for example by the United States in 1982 - Focus, 
GATT Newsletter Volume 68 February 1990.
302 With Hungary: 26 September 1988; with Poland: 19 September 1989; 




























































































European Coal and Steel Community followed.503
The European Agreements establishing an association between these 
countries and the European Communities came in Christmas of last 
year.504 The Preambles of these agreements, in an important concession 
to East European wishes, refer to potential EC membership "as an ultimate, 
though not automatic, goal".30 405 The approach in these agreements is to 
create economies in Eastern Europe in the image of the EC. This is a goal 
which is unattainable through trade remedy and extraterritorial antitrust 
law. The Agreements contain the basic framework of the EC fundamental 
freedoms of goods, services, establishment, and in more limited form 
without the right of entry, workers. The principle of non-discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality is present throughout. Most importantly, 
however, is Title V Chapter II which provides for the approximation of 
laws as a step to eventual EC membership. The Visegrad countries have 
announced that they will apply for membership simultaneously.306
303 With the Czeck and Slovak Republic: 28 June 1991; with Poland: 16 
October 1991; with Hungary: 31 October 1991.
304 16 December 1991.
305 Irish Center for European Law, Bulletin No. 14, May 1991.




























































































The Council by decision adopted the Interim Agreements on trade 
and trade related matters in February of this year. Article 1(1) of those 
agreements provides:
The Community and [country] shall gradually establish a free 
trade area in a transitional period lasting a maximum of 10 
years starting from the entry into force of this Agreement... in 
comformity with [the provisions] of the General Agreement on 
tariffs and trade.
It is being mooted that these three states are likely to be in a second wave 
of new members after some European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
states join in the mid-1990s.307 Commission President Delors has more 
realistically expressed the idea of a Europe of concentric circles, with a 
tightly knit European Community at the center. What is clear is that the 
United States will be on the very fringes.
As regards Russia Delors and Kozynev, the current Russian foreign 
minister, have announced that a cooperation agreement like those with the 
Visegrad countries will be concluded this year.308 Kozynev has talked of 
Russia joining the European Community some day.309 A cooperation
307 Czechoslovakia has initialed a Free Trade Agreement with EFTA 
already -Agence Europe 3 March 1992.
308 Agence Europe 12 March 1992.




























































































agreed has already been signed with Albania.31"
3. No GATT problem
The European Community has taken GATT Article XVII (3) to heart. 
That Article provides:
The contracting parties recognize that [state trading 
enterprises] might be operated so as to create serious obstacles 
to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such obstacles 
are of importance to the expansion of international trade.
GATT has itself established a trade policy training program for government
officials from Eastern and Central Europe. The increasing ties between
West and East Europe, which by their bilateral form exclude the United
States, are sanctioned by GATT Article XXIV on customs unions and free
trade areas. Paragraph 4 provides:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing 
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary 
agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the 
countries parties to such agreements.
Article 8(b) defines a free trade area as:
A group of two or more custom territories in which the duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV 
and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between




























































































the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories, [my emphasis]
This Article shows that the European Community and the nonmarket 
economies do not have to be closely integrated before they fall under the 
GATT exemptions. Under Article XXIV such free trade organizations do 
not have to place reductions in restrictions on a MFN basis. Fortress 
Europe seems suddenly to grow larger. And this is without consideration of 
the European Economic Area between European Free Trade Association 
and the European Community.
4. The United States response
The United States must look beyond domestic law. As the United 
States strives to aggressively implement increasingly protectionist laws, the 
European Community is creating trading fiefdoms in the new Europe. Not 
that the European Community law is any less strict. In fact, the figures on 
antidumping and antisubsidy investigations initiated between the years 1987 
to 1990 shows a strong increase in attention to nonmarket economies.311 
In 1989, fifty percent of the provisional duties imposed, seventy five per 
cent of the reviews of previous duties which concluded in the imposition of
311 Eighth Annual Report of the Commission on the Community’s 
Antidumping and Antisubsidy Activities, released on 29 January 1991. In 
1987, 5 out of 39 investigations concerned nonmarket economies. In 1988 




























































































definitive duties, and 100 per cent of the reviews which resulted in the 
amendment of existing duties, concerned nonmarket economies.
The United States has made some bilateral progress. On 11 November 
1989 President Bush designated Hungary a developing country eligible for 
benefits under the United States Generalized System of Preferences. Since 
1974 the President annually waived in the case of Hungary the freedom of 
emigration requirement of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the trade Act 
of 1974.312 President Bush is now pushing Congress to grant permanent 
MFN status to Hungary, but Congress is only prepared to meet him half­
way. A&*&A
Yet even in "holistic agreements" the United States believes in the 
virtue of aggression. The Poland-United States Treaty Concerning Business 
and Economic Relations,313 which entered into force on 21 March 1990, 
is a prime example. The President described it as "The first to be 
transmitted under my initiative to strengthen economic relations with East 
European countries, in support of the political and economic reforms taking
312 Multinational Strategies, Country Monitoring Service, LEXIS January 
1. 1990




























































































place there."314 A such it is to be welcomed. But the treaty’s significance 
and success is determined by how far it wrings concessions from an 
adversary; the treaty is described as the first time an East European 
country has consented to international arbitration of discriminatory 
treatment against a foreign investor, and the first time that such a country 
has recognized a more stringent standard of compensation for 
expropriation.315 The President summarizes the Treaty’s objectives: "It 
will encourage, facilitate, and protect United States investment and business 
activity in Poland".316 There are no provisions for aid; any benefit that 
will accrue to Poland will be the result of investment with secured 
repatriation of profits. If Poland achieves a benefit, then it is incidental to 
the provisions of this agreement.
136
5. Danger for emerging economies
There is a real risk that these agreements will allow the nonmarket
314 Letter of transmittal, the White House, 19 June 1990. The United 
States also entered into an agreement on trade relations with Mongolia on 
23 January 1991 - 30 I.L.M. 515 (1991).
315 29 I.L.M. 1194 at 1198 (1990).
316 Letter of transmittal, the White House, 19 June 1990. See also the 
Letter of Submittal, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 8 June 1980, 
where the aim of the Treaty is described the extension of United States 





























































































economy countries only to change from their inferior trade status to the 
inferior status of a developing debtor country. The Sixth Review of Trade 
with Romania under the Protocol of Accession illustrated the potential 
tensions.317 The Romanian representative stated that foreign debt 
servicing reduced the amount of convertible currency available for imports 
by 50 per cent. Anticipating the reimbursement of part of the debt would 
reduce interest payments and make convertible currency more available for 
purchasing market economy exports.318 The United States representative 
asked how the decline in purchases was related to Romania’s commitment 
to the Protocol of Accession. The Romanian representative replied that it 
was due to weak demand in contracting parties for Romanian exports and 
repeated:
Romania’s foreign debt was owed to contracting parties and in 
convertible currency.... The decline was not due to 
discrimination on the part of Romania but to insufficient 
financial means.... Romania’s authorities had endeavored to 
repay its debt.
The United States repeated that Romania’s debt problems did not 
address the question of import commitments under the Protocol of
3,7 GATT 35 BISD 1988, p.343.




























































































Accession and was beyond the terms of reference of the Working Party.319 
The European Community representative’s remarks were a toned down 
version of those of the United States. If trade liberalization is no more than 
a step to the domination of the strongest, then the status of nations will 
follow the status of people which resulted from the division of labor and the 
accumulation of capital. If a more enlightened general strategy is not 
adopted than the nonmarket economy countries will have thrown off the 
yoke of communist central planning merely to become, under the more 
indirect oppression of the free market, free instead of unfree underdogs.
5. "Make love, not war"
The United States rules on trade with nonmarket economies are no 
less protectionist than those of the European Community. Yet in the face 
of the European Community’s rapid gains in economic control over the 
nonmarket economy countries, in the United States trade hawks argue that 
now the security imperative has been reduced there is an opportunity for 
greater unilateral action to promote U.S. trade interests.320 T r a d e  
accounted for ninety per cent of the United States GNP growth in 1990. A
319 Id, paragraph 25, p.344.
320 Bergsten, The World Economy After the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, 




























































































known economist recently declared that "Trade is now the driving force of 
our economy...[it is] the only thing standing between a recession and a 
depression".321 And yet zealous protectionists, praising aggression and 
urging caution in the United States reactions to changes in Europe, risk 
replacing military conflict with the sort of bilateral aggressive conflict over 
economic issues322 that lead to such increased political rivalries before the 
two Great Wars. It is the United States who will lose.323
6. Back to the Future II
As the Bard wrote: "where are you tonight?".324 Combining reform 
of domestic law with aggressive international diplomacy to establish 
agreements and arrangements with the nonmarket economy countries will 
benefit the United States. If the United States wishes to gain some
321 Warren T. Brookes, San Francisco Chronicle, May 14 1991.
322 Reactions have already started. The Korean Trade Commission 
recently ruled by Seoul held that three foreign companies sold plastic resin 
in South Korea at artificially low prices. The companies were from Japan, 
Germany, and the United States. There are accusations in the United States 
and Europe that Korea is using its antidumping laws unfairly as it prepares 
an export drive for its petrochemical industry - Wall Street Journal 25 April 
1991.
323 These risks were a major theme of the conference The Future of 
European Society held by the Institute of International Studies in UC 
Berkeley in April 1991.




























































































international institutional counterbalance to the European Community’s 
monopoly on economic issues in Europe, then GATT is the way to do it. 
The situation in Eastern Europe provides a speeded up, scaled down trial 
run for how to cope with the prospect of renewed GATT membership for 
China, which is under consideration by a GATT working party,325 and 
possible new membership for the Russian Federation. So far, the United 
States has not done well. Having protected Europe for the duration of the 
Cold War, it is reaping few of the benefits of its end.
An investment in a holistic strategy to deal with the changing
economies of Eastern Europe, even if it classified as a research experiment
in preparation for the big event of possible Chinese and Russian GATT
membership, would benefit the United States economically, reduce
unnecessary and unprofitable adversariness, and make it some new friends.
The former GATT economist Jan Tumlir stated:
The trade part of the international economy order can thus be 
understood as a set of policy commitments exchanges between 
and among countries in order to minimize policy-generated 
uncertainty and so to maximize gains from trade.326
The nonmarket economy countries considered are not enemies but rather
325 GATT Activities 1990 p. 132.




























































































NEMs - newly emerging markets. A healthy combination of competition and 
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